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PRUDENT BEAR FUNDS Inc c/o US Bancorp Fund Services, LLC – ‘N-30D’ for 9/30/02

On:  Friday, 12/6/02, at 6:49pm ET   ·   As of:  12/9/02   ·   Effective:  12/9/02   ·   For:  9/30/02   ·   Accession #:  898531-2-464   ·   File #:  811-09120

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  As Of                Filer                Filing    For·On·As Docs:Size              Issuer               Agent

12/09/02  PRUDENT BEAR FUNDS Inc c/o U… LLC N-30D       9/30/02    1:151K                                   Dixon MRD & Co/FA

Annual or Semi-Annual Report Mailed to Shareholders   —   Rule 30d-1
Filing Table of Contents

Document/Exhibit                   Description                      Pages   Size 

 1: N-30D       Annual or Semi-Annual Report Mailed to                72±   286K 
                          Shareholders                                           



PRUDENT BEAR FUNDS, INC. ANNUAL REPORT SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 PRUDENT BEAR FUND NO LOAD SHARES CLASS C SHARES PRUDENT SAFE HARBOR FUND PRUDENT BEAR FUNDS, INC. PRUDENT BEAR FUND Date Prudent Bear Fund - No Load Shares S&P 500 NASDAQ Composite ---- ---------------------------------- ------- ---------------- 12/28/95 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 3/31/96 $9,520 $10,568 $10,479 9/30/96 $8,880 $11,384 $11,694 3/31/97 $9,018 $12,663 $11,663 9/30/97 $7,420 $15,988 $16,181 3/31/98 $6,822 $18,741 $17,570 9/30/98 $7,692 $17,435 $16,231 3/31/99 $4,866 $22,201 $23,609 9/30/99 $4,910 $22,282 $26,359 3/31/00 $4,136 $26,184 $43,937 9/30/00 $4,441 $25,242 $35,469 3/31/01 $6,284 $20,508 $17,829 9/30/01 $7,495 $18,522 $14,545 3/31/02 $6,391 $20,558 $17,938 9/30/02 $10,154 $14,728 $11,414 For the period ended September 30, 2002 Annualized ----------------------------------------- One Five Since Year Year Inception ---- ---- --------- Prudent Bear Fund - No Load Shares 35.47% 6.48% 0.23% S&P 500 (20.49)% (1.63)% 5.90% NASDAQ Composite (21.80)% (7.01)% 1.98% Date Prudent Bear Fund - Class C Shares S&P 500 NASDAQ Composite ---- ---------------------------------- ------- ---------------- 2/8/99 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 3/31/99 $9,331 $10,363 $10,376 6/30/99 $8,075 $11,093 $11,327 9/30/99 $9,393 $10,401 $11,585 12/31/99 $7,945 $11,948 $11,175 3/31/00 $7,858 $12,222 $19,310 6/30/00 $8,184 $11,898 $16,829 9/30/00 $8,423 $11,782 $15,589 12/31/00 $10,298 $10,860 $10,505 3/31/01 $11,883 $9,573 $7,836 6/30/01 $9,981 $10,133 $9,211 9/30/01 $14,101 $8,646 $6,392 12/31/01 $10,948 $9,570 $8,325 3/31/02 $11,947 $9,596 $7,884 6/30/02 $16,131 $8,310 $6,256 9/30/02 $18,920 $6,875 $5,016 For the period ended September 30, 2002 Annualized Since One Year Inception -------- --------- Prudent Bear Fund - Class C Shares 34.18% 19.14% S&P 500 (20.49)% (9.78)% NASDAQ Composite (21.80)% (17.26)% The Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) is a capital-weighted index, representing the aggregate market value of the common equity of 500 stocks primarily traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The NASDAQ Composite Index is a broad-based capitalization-weighted index of all NASDAQ stocks. These charts assume an initial gross investment of $10,000 made on 12/28/95 and 2/08/99 (commencement of operations) for the No Load Shares and Class C Shares, respectively. Returns shown include the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not predictive of future performance. The graph and the table do not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on fund distributions or the redemption of fund shares. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that your shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than the original cost. PRUDENT SAFE HARBOR FUND Salomon Smith Barney Merrill Lynch Prudent Safe European World Govt. Pan-Europe Date Harbor Fund Bond Index Govt. Index ---- ----------- -------------------- ----------- 2/2/00 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 3/31/00 $9,878 $10,035 $10,074 6/30/00 $9,709 $10,057 $10,124 9/30/00 $9,340 $9,435 $10,248 12/31/00 $9,398 $10,308 $10,489 3/31/01 $9,016 $9,890 $10,659 6/30/01 $9,026 $9,464 $10,752 9/30/01 $9,578 $10,473 $11,019 12/31/01 $9,663 $10,355 $11,104 3/31/02 $10,354 $10,089 $11,116 6/30/02 $11,518 $11,696 $11,315 9/30/02 $11,736 $12,323 $11,604 For the period ended September 30, 2002 Annualized Since One Year Inception -------- --------- Prudent Safe Harbor Fund 22.54% 6.20% Salomon Smith Barney European World Government Bond Index (WGBI) 17.65% 8.16% Merrill Lynch Pan Europe Government Index, 1-3 years 5.31% 5.74% The Salomon Smith Barney European World Government Bond Index (WGBI) consists of those fifteen sectors of the Salomon Smith Barney WGBI that are geographically located in Europe, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The Pan-Europe Government Index tracks the total return performance of the outstanding debt of European sovereign issuers. It is a market capitalization-weighted basket comprising Euro participant, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K. sovereign bonds issued in their respective domestic markets and denominated in their local currency. This index is further segmented by debt issues maturing from 1-3 years. These charts assume an initial gross investment of $10,000 made on 2/02/00 (commencement of operations). Returns shown include the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not predictive of future performance. The graph and the table do not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on fund distributions or the redemption of fund shares. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that your shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than the original cost. PRUDENT BEAR FUNDS, INC. September 30, 2002 Dear Shareholder, The Prudent Bear Fund No-Load shares returned 17.54% in the third quarter while the S&P 500 lost 17.28% and the NASDAQ lost 19.90%. For the six months ended September 30, 2002, the fund returned 58.89% while the S&P 500 lost 28.36% and the NASDAQ lost 36.49%. For the 12 months, the fund returned 35.47% compared to a loss of 20.49% for the S&P 500 and a loss of 21.80% for the NASDAQ. Consistent with our investment philosophy, the fund held more short than long equity positions throughout the period. Gains from short positions in individual stocks, indexes, and futures positions, along with gains from put options, and to a lesser extent, profitable long investments (primarily gold stocks), were responsible for the fund's performance. As a result, the Prudent Bear Fund continued to help protect investors during a particularly severe downward leg of the secular bear market. Selling was so intense late in the third quarter that the market appeared technically poised to rally, so the fund ended the period with less short exposure than usual. The fund has maintained this more conservative posture as we approach calendar year-end. However, the fund remains far more short than long as we are convinced that this bear market has further to run. We will increase exposure once we believe the risk of continued sharp rallies has been reduced. The Prudent Safe Harbor Fund returned 13.35% for the six months and 22.54% for the 12 months ended September 30, 2002. The fund benefited from a strong rally in gold stocks in the first six months of the period. In the last six months of the period, the fund benefited from a weakening dollar, a rally in gold and gold stocks, and falling short-term interest rates (higher bond prices). The question seemingly on every investor's mind is, "Shouldn't the pain be about overo" This bear market to date has been more severe than any bear market since the 1930s, so the consensus expectation is that it should be about complete. After growing accustomed to an 18-year bull market, investors feel entitled to rising prices, and the pundits continue to tell them that they lay right around the corner. I will attempt to make a strong case in this letter that this indeed is not the case, and that unfortunately we are still relatively early in this secular bear market. There is a certain symmetry in financial markets, just as there is in life. The larger the excesses, the more extreme will be the adjustments back to fair value. This secular bull market, which culminated during the first quarter of 2000, was the greatest in a century. Understanding symmetry, is there any reason to expect that the secular bear market that corrects that bull market's excesses won't also be the greatest in the last 100 yearso We don't think so. Several facts lead us to believe that we are not yet close to a new bull cycle, with two important ones being: 1.) The stock market is NOT cheap, and 2.) There has not been REAL investor capitulation. To us, it appears that anybody looking objectively at the U.S. market today would conclude that it remains hopelessly overvalued on a host of measures: the ratio of the market cap to GDP, Tobin's Q, and price/earnings ratios. Stocks are trading at 40-50 times Standard & Poor's trailing "Core Earnings." This new measure strips away much of a company's ability to put the best face possible on operating results. According to S&P, "_Core Earnings focuses on the results of a company's core business. It excludes items, such as litigation costs, that are outside the core business, and includes items, such as employee stock option grants, that are part of the core business." S&P has calculated two versions of Core Earnings and stocks trade around 40 times the more liberal measure (which ignores certain pension costs). Stocks also remain expensive based on dividend yields. In addition, we are only now beginning to see widespread household liquidation of mutual fund holdings. This persistent pattern of liquidation began only after the bear market was two years old and the decline in the major indices exceeded 30%. One of our data samples indicates light inflows may have resumed in early November. However, these are weak indicated flows despite an 18% prior rally, and are more consistent with an overall tendency toward redemptions than anything else. History tells us that once these outflows start in earnest, they can last for a long time. The cumulative outflows so far have been very brief, and are only a very small fraction of the prior inflows. So those are good reasons as to why a bull market is not about to begin, but then investors always ask us "how low could this market goo" According to Dr. Peter Bernstein, the average bear market in the last century has given back from its high 20.5 quarters of previous gains, or a little more than five years of previous gains. Therefore, if the present bear market is an average bear market, the indices will decline to around their 1995 level - in the case of the Dow, about 4000. The problem however, is that this bear market is not shaping up as an "average bear market" but something far more serious. First of all, we must understand the 1982-2000 bull market wasn't an average bull market, but the longest bull market in the history of the United States. Following the 1929 peak, when valuations were far lower and the nation's debt status much less severe, the market gave back 7.5 years of previous gains. The brief 1970 bear market and the sharp 1973-1974 bear markets gave back, respectively, seven and eight years of previous gains. Therefore, one could expect this bear market to give back a very minimum of eight years of previous gains taking us to about 3200 on the Dow. But we are convinced that this bear market will correct for previous gains going back to around 1990 or about ten years, which would take the index down to about 2500. We also thank Dr. Mark Faber for this prescient analysis. Now let's look at the economic landscape for a while which also confirms our thinking that we indeed have significant trouble ahead. To begin with, we're still in a jobless recovery. New claims for unemployment insurance remain around the 400,000 mark, while layoffs and "cost cutting" remain the order of the day among corporations. The employment picture seems to get uglier by the day and nothing instills a greater sense of restraint in consumers than fear of losing their jobs. The unbelievable resilience of an overextended American consumer could well be drawing to a close and let there be no doubt that the U.S. consumer has kept the economy growing over the last two years. Companies are still retrenching as corporate profits continue to decline and we expect that the pace of the job cutbacks will likely accelerate. This raises a huge question mark over the sustainability of consumer spending. All of this is ominous for the U.S. economy and for a U.S.-centric global economy. For too long the American consumer has been the bedrock of support on both counts. Overextended households have done their best to ignore the devastating loss of equity wealth. Yet behavioral finance tells us it's only a matter of time before the denial cracks and consumers feel the full force of a possible asymmetrical wealth effect. At the same time, the life-cycle savings hypothesis argues that the saving-short consumers ultimately have no choice but to shift away from spending and toward saving. The recent data flow hints that such impacts may not be idle conjecture. Consumer spending declined by 0.4% in September - while the savings rate rose to 4.2% versus 3.4% in August. We have experienced an interest rate collapse, a historic refinancing boom, and the "easiest" money imaginable in the consumer finance arena. Yet, continued booming consumer borrowing and spending is barely keeping the maladjusted economy afloat. Today the consumer is waterlogged and exhausted. The consumption-based economy looks weathered and frail. OVERALL ECONOMY GDP rose strongly in the third quarter, but that paints a misleading picture of the economy's underlying trend. It is our sense that economists' focus on GDP growth is missing important nuances of contemporary "output." Should we give the same weight to the "output" of lawyers, insurance salesmen, and mortgage brokers as we do to the output of manufacturerso From the Bureau of Economic Analysis: "The 2001 economic slowdown was mild by historical standards because of strong growth in real GDP for private services- producing industries that helped to offset sharp declines in real GDP for private goods-producing industries_ In 2001, real GDP for private services- producing industries increased 1.7 percent, while private goods-producing industries dropped 4.2 percent, primarily reflecting a 6.0 percent drop in manufacturing_ Growth was led by such large private services-producing industries as communications (12.3 percent); retail trade (4.6 percent); finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) (2.8 percent); and services (0.9 percent). Declines, particularly in the manufacturing industries, were steep. Durable-goods manufacturing decreased 5.2 percent, and non-durable-goods manufacturing decreased 7.1 percent." Yet the constant refrain of Wall Street economists and strategists is of a fundamentally sound economy and "If only we had more lending, we could stimulate more consumption to keep the economy thriving." In our view, it will simply be impossible for the impaired U.S. credit system to generate sufficient monetary stimulus to sustain the maladjusted economy. It is both wrong and simplistic to characterize our current problems as a simple case of insufficient money and credit. It is more a symptom of TOO MUCH wasted finance that should have never been created in the first place. It is not so much "debt deflation" per se that we are on the threshold of experiencing, as it is a NECESSARY REVALUATION AND A CORRECTION OF PRIOR CREDIT EXCESSES. The current period is eerily reminiscent of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Regrettably, the debates that took place relating to prices, markets, and monetary management were anything but satisfactorily resolved in the economic history books. In the end, the Monetarists "won" the debate and historical accounts of the period were revised to blame the Depression on a shortage of money and liquidity. In our view, they got it absolutely wrong and we are paying the price for this mistake today. Amazingly, virtually no one today is willing to admit that Federal Reserve policy has been an unmitigated disaster, just like it was in the late 1920s, as the problem was too much credit, which caused inflation in asset prices, which caused massive imbalances and a maladjusted economy. What we have today is so far removed from sound money, with the lunatics directing the governors of the asylum to pump in only stronger laughing gas, or more money, or better yet said, "more debt." My associate Doug Noland has written about these credit excesses for years in his widely acclaimed Credit Bubble Bulletin on our website, which largely serves as the basis for this shareholders' letter. Most economists today recommend more accommodative monetary policy as the price- level, profit, financial market, and economic elixir. That the recent massive increase of easy money has failed to work its magic only emboldens the inflationists to cheer for ever-heavier doses of credit. Thus continues the slippery slope to absolute monetary recklessness. Meanwhile, the financial sphere enjoys tremendous "profits" from the unrelenting credit expansion, although the bounty looks increasingly in jeopardy. So the specter of deflation is today's evil villain to be eliminated with virtually free money (and greater financial windfalls for the financiers). If we can only elevate earnings and stock prices, the boom can run indefinitely, they say. The Monetarists, "Keynesians," and "Kudlowians" clamor for more "liquidity" and "high powered money" in the face of an over-liquefied credit market and endless non-bank credit creation. This type of thinking is absolutely flawed and dangerous. We doubt history provides a more ironclad case against discretionary monetary management, but unfortunately, today's economists haven't understood the great lessons taught 50-60 years ago. For too long, the day of reckoning for past credit and speculative excess has been postponed by nurturing only greater financial and economic imbalances. How the Fed has grossly mismanaged this unfolding fiasco goes directly back to historical revisionism of the overriding causes of the Great Depression. We have never doubted that the answer to financial and economic ills would not be found with more credit. This was explained by some legendary economists from decades ago. This key issue goes all the way back to John Law's great fallacy: that economic wealth can be created simply by providing additional money ("finance"). It is also interesting to note that much of today's spurious analysis prefers the "Keynesian" label when it would be more aptly termed "John Lawsian Inflationism," after the infamous financier of Mississippi Bubble fame. We also should have learned from the economic woes of South America that printing more money does not create more wealth. However, the reality is that credit and speculative excess only begets additional excess and unpredictable (in the current case, elongated) boom and bust cycles. Over time, the financial system has become hopelessly dysfunctional, as unlimited finance has been directed to sectors providing greater financial gains rather than economic returns. Financial "profits," as opposed to true economic profits, govern the economy like never before. Faulty monetary processes - where money and credit are created and directed into the economy - only become more indelible. This ensures that finance is created in excess and misallocated, with the quality of new debt poor and worsening. We have recently experienced an unprecedented ballooning in non-productive debt throughout the system. Since the beginning of 1996 (26 quarters), total credit market debt has increased by $12 trillion, or 65%. Of this total, financial sector debt has jumped by 130% to $9.8 trillion. Non-financial credit market borrowings rose 46%. To make matters worse, this credit explosion has run concomitant with a shrinking manufacturing base. Sure, a community with an over-active credit mechanism does afford the seductive opportunity to "profit" from increased leisure "services" (such as providing back rubs and preparing each other meals while importing goods from elsewhere). And the resulting financial "wealth" creation is likely then transmitted to rising home prices and a self-reinforcing but unsustainable and precarious boom. But make no mistake; this mirage of prosperity only survives as long as additional money and credit are forthcoming. At the end of the day, the "services" providers (back-rubbers and cooks) are left with a lot of financial claims but not much in the way of economic value supporting them. As an economy, we will have no choice but to cut way back on "services" and consumption and focus our energies on producing things that we and our trading partners would like to consume. We've witnessed incredible reckless credit and speculative excess over the years. Over time, only more dangerous excesses have been perpetrated in an effort to avoid the necessary pain of working off the previous financial follies. The Fed and financial sector continue to work diligently to avoid (postpone) learning lessons as they fight credit problems with more credit, compensating for bursting bubbles by creating even larger bubbles. Yet, if the Fed saw no alternative than to collapse interest rates in response to the collapsing NASDAQ Bubble, shouldn't they at least have moved to restrain the over-aggressive mortgage finance sectoro After all, it doesn't take rocket science to recognize that speculative impulses had become imbedded in the marketplace, that the speculating "infrastructure" was firmly in place on Wall Street, and that the methods of creating unlimited finance for the purpose of leveraged speculation had been mastered throughout the financial system. To protect financial stability, the Fed should have warded off mounting lending and speculative excesses. This indeed should be the mission of the Federal Reserve, "to protect financial stability." Instead they nurtured and supported these dangerous speculative impulses. Still apparently unrecognized by most, the 1990s boom was fueled largely by non- bank credit creation, much of it marketable securities, outside of the control of the Federal Reserve. The government-sponsored enterprises and the asset/mortgage-backed securities markets have been conspicuous in this regard. And while total credit market debt expanded $12 trillion over the past 26 quarters, Federal Reserve assets increased by only about $240 billion. There is today resolute confidence that the Fed can easily expand its securities holdings if it desires to combat economic weakness or, worse yet, deflation. But with a credit bubble of this magnitude, it would take trillions of new credit created in the markets to sustain the bubble, rather than billions of Fed balance sheet expansion. The longer the bubble is allowed to run, the more it becomes outside of the Fed's control. There is today a populas opinion that there are no costs associated with Fed rate cuts, thus every reason to aggressively cut first and ask questions later. While our central bankers were determined to avoid learning lessons from the Japanese bubble experience and from the 1920s, they do appreciate that it is expedient to "learn" from dismal post-Bubble struggles - the key is to move early and move aggressively. But such policies are throwing gas on a fire of gross excess throughout the financial sphere. Our analysis convinces us that this is precisely the recipe that led to a hopelessly deranged financial sphere that was resolved with the 1930s financial collapse and the Great Depression. It is our view that the post 9/11 aggressive rate cuts (and consequent blow-off excesses throughout mortgage finance and credit market speculation) were an even greater mistake than the post- Russia/LTCM cuts and "reliquification" that fueled the fateful technology/stock market speculative blow-off. Consider the massive costs of that policy error. Incredibly, no one will step up and admit we have set course for financial disaster. Sure, ultra-easy money has stimulated unprecedented household borrowings. These spikes in demand for homes and autos have kept GDP advancing for a few additional quarters. But this will ensure a huge future price to pay for artificially inflating sales. It was absolutely irresponsible monetary policy to actively stimulate consumer over-borrowing and spending in this manner - in a desperate attempt to sustain unsustainable boom-time demand. History will show this to have been a disastrous mistake. If, like the early 1990s, we were suffering merely from a credit crunch, Fed "reliquification" could reinvigorate the impaired credit system. But today, additional credit creation only feeds an out-of-control financial sphere and further distorts the structure of the real economy. Neither credit crunch nor deflation is the issue today. The issue is that we have no alternative but to deal with faltering credit, speculative, and economic bubbles of historic proportions. We believe we have created a dangerous monetary gamble with great risk and NO possibility for success. There is no changing the harsh reality of the historic credit bubble that has resulted in a fragile financial sector and horribly maladjusted economy. Unfortunately, no amount of "money" can "right" the system, only extend the wrong and create even greater imbalances. The collapsing stock market bubble is not the central issue for today, but it should be recognized as crucial evidence of much greater systemic ills inflicted by "contemporary finance" and excessive stimuli. Similar speculative and inflationary dynamics that fostered stock market booms and busts have also dominated the expansive global "risk" markets (predominantly credit market related), and that much of contemporary "structured finance" is more aptly named "speculative finance." The residual is an unfathomable and increasingly onerous mountain of global financial claims (mostly debt). HOUSING BUBBLE It truly has been the mortgage finance bubble keeping the consumer spending and the U.S. economy "resilient." As much as Chairman Alan Greenspan would like to deny it, we have been in a housing bubble for some time. Furthermore, we are likely in the late stages of a classic blow-off market top. Greenspan's assertion that there is no housing bubble is analogous to an investment banker stating in 1999 that there was no telecom debt bubble because few companies were defaulting. Just give it time_ The key to identifying bubbles, of course, is in protracted credit excess. Distress arrives when credit excess inevitably subsides. Asset inflation then reverses course, credit availability disappears, and credit losses quickly emerge. This year's record pace and September's 13.3% spectacular rise of new home sales smack strongly of a top. New homes have been selling at an unprecedented one million unit pace. September's average price of $218,100 was up another 7.3% year-over-year, on top of years of steady price inflation. New home sales are on pace to surpass last year's record 908,000 new homes sold by about 5%. It is worth noting that new homes sold at an annualized rate of about 600,000 units during the first five years of the 1990s, surpassing 700,000 units for the first time during 1997, 800,000 during 1998, and 900,000 for the first time last year. Existing home sales are also on pace for another record year. In California, year-over-year price gains of 17.3% through September, to $323,310, remain phenomenal. But sharp sales declines are a troubling sign. Statewide single-family sales were down 12.3% from August. In fact, single- family sales were only 3.9% above depressed levels from September 2001. Interestingly, sales were down 25% from August and more in key upper-end markets in Monterey County, Santa Cruz County, Santa Barbara and Ventura County. Anecdotal accounts have sales slowing and inventory building in many key housing markets. It is unbelievable, but it appears that we will see total mortgage credit GROWTH surpass $800 billion this year, with a growth rate in the neighborhood of 12%. This $800 billion will put five-year total mortgage debt growth at almost $2.5 trillion, or about 48%. Even during the late 1980s real estate lending excess, total annual mortgage credit growth averaged only about $300 billion (1987 to 1989). It is an amazing phenomenon of protracted bull markets (especially contemporary ones buttressed by uncontrolled fiat money, runaway Credit systems and endemic speculation) that they invariably end with a wild terminal phase of gross speculative excess. After witnessing a "once in a lifetime" spectacular NASDAQ/stock market blow-off, we are now afforded the unfortunate opportunity of viewing a development of similar historic proportions today throughout mortgage finance. To make matters worse, it is our fear that unprecedented mortgage debt is being acquired by highly leveraged interest rate speculators. That this has become the "hot" financial speculation at this stage of the credit and economic cycles should be recognized as a debacle in the making. Only time will tell as to the level of leveraged speculation and to what extent troubled borrowers are extracting every penny of equity in a desperate attempt to stay afloat. But there is absolutely no doubt that tens of billions of problematic credit card debt is being transformed into mortgage balances. There is no doubt that equity extraction has financed unprecedented consumption. And it is inarguable that leveraged speculation has played an instrumental role as "financier." Recently, bankers have begun selectively tightening underwriting standards and building loan-loss reserves against increases in real estate loan delinquencies and defaults. We strongly believe that this growing concern among lenders represents a turning point in the real estate debate. As we witnessed with the telecom debt bubble, it is amazing how fast perceptions can change. And bubbles do not respond well to any tempering of credit availability. Yet such a troublesome circumstance is inevitable, as all great bubbles must come to an end. Considering the fact that we are in the midst of unprecedented mortgage credit creation, one would surely not expect credit problems to be a significant issue. But at mortgage insurers such as MGIC and Radian, delinquencies and losses have increased significantly. This does not bode well for the time when mortgage lending inevitably slows. We are highly confident that the models employed by the likes of the REITS, Fannie and Freddie, the mortgage insurers, banks and S&Ls, are underestimating future credit losses. Yet based on these models, the vice chairman of Fannie Mae was recently quoted as follows when she spoke of the rosy outlook for housing for the rest of the decade: "We can deliver the best decade for housing we've ever seen_ There are some misconceptions about what it takes to buy a home... Too many Americans still think it's necessary to put 20 percent down on a house or have perfect credit and don't realize underwriting innovations have allowed homebuyers to put down 1 percent - or even nothing - and still purchase a home." And this is no bubble being caused by dysfunctional credit excess? We can only hope that the damage caused by this year's speculative "blow-off" within the great mortgage finance bubble is not the unmitigated disaster for the consumer sector that the 1999 telecom debt "blow-off" has proved to be for the corporate sector. It is a central facet of Credit Bubble analysis (as we learned from the Austrian school of economics) that the resulting damage during the bust will be proportional to the nature and degree of excess during the boom. As we have witnessed, risk grows exponentially through the life of the boom. Not only does the quality of individual credits deteriorate over time, but also the quantity of new (weak) credits grows at a compounding rate. Moreover, the structural impact to the real economy becomes more extreme at the late stages of the speculative credit cycle (distortions, both financial and economic, accumulate on top of distortions). The telecom credit bubble provides an historic example of these dynamics, as extreme lending excess created an industry devoid of economic profits and lacking the necessary cash flow to service mushroomed debt levels. The industry has been irreparably decimated, while lenders are facing years of impairment. The Fed's response has been to make "loose money" history's most accommodative ("loosest"). The economic community is now fixated on the benefits a consumer receives from refinancing at a lower interest rate, while extracting equity to support spending. But what are the systemic consequences if the entire country does it, and are they permanent or transitory, stabilizing or destabilizingo Well, we have witnessed how the mortgage finance bubble has both supported boom- time over-consumption and augmented financial sector liquidity. But the economic consensus is again seriously erring in its analysis. They are once more extrapolating absolutely unsustainable excesses from the "terminal stage" of the bubble. Moreover, the consensus does not appreciate the transitory nature of the monetary affects of this bubble or the heightened financial fragility that will be the legacy of this ill-advised mortgage finance free-for-all. The telecom/IT sector provided a seemingly wonderful mechanism for monetary stimulation (with few visible problematic inflationary manifestations); that is until its increasingly voracious appetite for new credits could not be satisfied and the bubble began to implode. Nor will the simple elixir of cutting rates restore the boom times quickly: Excess capacity and inventory of servers, storage, PCs, network equipment, fiber optic lines, semiconductors and software are the legacy of the multi-year buying binge that occurred in the 1990s, aided and abetted by the largesse of the Federal Reserve and overheated financial sector. Lower interest rates and more Fed credit are not the answer to the tech industry's problems. The industry requires a period of sustained contraction and consolidation to become healthier. Based upon the excesses still in the system, this process still has much longer to run and no amount of loose money will change that fact. Consider the example of Intel, long one of Wall Street's "growth stocks." Based on the company's most recent forecasts, analysts are now expecting 2003 quarterly revenues to come in around $6.5 billion, essentially the same level that Intel reported in the first quarter of 1997, SIX FULL YEARS AGO. The company has built more capacity than it can use and the corresponding rise in costs is continuing to pressure gross margins. Meanwhile, consumers are demanding $300 PCs. Intel's current cost structure cannot be sustained with this reality, which means more likely disappointment ahead. Nor is there any evidence of recovery in the telecom and network equipment business. Lucent has just announced a further 10,000 job cuts in an attempt to outrace "the precipitous decline in spending, particularly in North America." Motorola has slashed its Q4 and 2003 forecasts. In addition to the fall-off in wireless handset orders, wireless equipment orders plunged 44% year-over-year and broadband communications orders plummeted by 48%. JDS Uniphase has sharply lowered Q4 revenue forecasts and projected further job cuts. Corning has recently announced the closure of three more optical fiber plants and laid off a further 2,200 employees. Cisco Systems announced lower revenue forecasts for the fourth quarter; its book-to-bill ratio fell below 1.0 for the first time in years, rendering even these more cautious forecasts somewhat suspect. The list goes on. SPECULATIVE CAPITAL FLOWS Reportedly, the amount invested with the hedge fund community is approaching $800 billion. Throw in their leveraged positions, along with those operating like hedge funds, the Wall Street proprietary trading desks and other speculators, and performance chasing retail mutual fund "investors," and you have truly unfathomable speculative flows that have come to dominate the marketplace. More and more hedge fund managers are reporting that they cannot generate positive returns because the market is losing liquidity and they have so many competitors. Fund-of-fund managers report that such complaints from hedge fund managers are legion. Proprietary traders at investment banks are having a similar experience. On the recent violent rally off the early October low, hedge funds, which were in aggregate very short at the bottom, reportedly have been covering. At the same time the public has redeemed equity mutual funds into the rally. This is in contrast to their more positive household behavior on prior rallies since the top in 2000. It appears that the public is leaving the market, forcing hedge funds to trade more and more with themselves. This may be forcing hedge funds to take directional bets to generate returns. In recent years, the total volume of funds that have gone into long/short equity hedge funds may have risen to many hundreds of billions of dollars on a global basis. Many of these funds employ leverage; as a consequence their aggregate positions may be two or more times their net asset value, and they are now a major class of stock market participant. Most of these funds try to trade actively from both the short and long side of the stock market. Their very active trading strategies imply that their role in daily market activity greatly exceeds their share of the aggregate equity market portfolio. Today, hedge funds and other speculators are often seeking to profit from the selling of stocks and corporate bonds, as opposed to purchasing them. We also have some of the leading financial institutions with leveraged exposure to both the financial assets they hold and the derivative protection they have written. This exposure (and the systemic ramifications) leads to aggressive trend- following selling from the risk averse, as well as the gains-seeking speculators. This process engenders additional hedging-related selling from the derivative traders in a self-reinforcing spiral that holds the potential to lead to financial collapse. That key derivative players such as JP Morgan Chase and the European financial institutions are facing mounting difficulties is increasingly looking like a decisive blow to "structured finance." The risk averse may now gravitate away from the securities these institutions either directly or indirectly support. The above-mentioned institutions have been instrumental players in providing credit availability throughout the U.S. system. These institutions are at the very epicenter of "structured finance," and any loss in confidence in a major player is a blow to the entire system. This "New Age" system of structured finance has created greater credit availability during the boom. What then, are the consequences to the financial system and the economy if this untested system - that has come to absolutely dominate credit creation - falterso If it becomes more enticing for the speculators to sell securities, while the dynamic "delta" hedgers are forced to short securities to hedge their exposure, who will be the buyerso What if a preponderance of performance-chasing speculators and dynamic hedgers turn into sellers instead of buyerso Will the economy not be strangled from a systemic credit cruncho Doesn't it become one chaotic and unstable bet on system stability - a battle between those speculators betting the system holds and financial asset prices recover, matched against those speculating that individual companies and the general economy will face mounting troubleso At the minimum, isn't this a complete breakdown of the capital allocation process? PROBLEMS IN ASSET BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS With the confluence of over-leverage, fraud, the collapse of the technology/telecom bubble, and a deteriorating general business environment, the corporate bond market has gone through a punishing dislocation. The risk-averse marketplace has been closed to the vast majority of American corporations, many desperately in need of additional borrowings. The capacity for Wall Street to create palatable top-rated securities in this environment has played a critical role supporting the business sector and general economy. The booming asset- backed securities marketplace has played an instrumental role. But this sector is now under heightened stress. There were an unprecedented 280 downgrades of U.S. asset-backed securities in the third quarter - more than double the 132 of the second quarter. In all of 2001, there were only 245. We have seen mounting problems in sub-prime credit cards and a virtual collapse in the market for securities backed by manufactured housing. Recently, spreads have widened significantly in the home equity-backed area, in what appears to be a "natural" progression of credit problems associated with the bursting of the consumer bubble. Any waning of credit availability in the home equity area would be a major development. And with heightened stress for key financial players such as Capital One, Ford and Sears, there is a distinct possibility that general consumer credit availability could become a significant issue going forward. A faltering consumer sector would have dire ramifications for the entire ABS marketplace as well as the vulnerable mortgage arena. Despite troubling signs, asset-backed security issuance remains extraordinary. Year-to-date, total issuance of $299 billion is running 22.5% above year ago levels. Remarkably, home equity issuance of $122 billion is up 73% from last year's record level. Auto-backed issuance is booming as well. New auto loan data is indicative of ultra-easy credit availability. For the third quarter, the average interest rate was 2.72% for a 58.4-month loan at 96% loan-to-value. This compares to the first quarter's 5.32% for 53.9 months at 90% loan to value. The asset-backed issuance boom is being supported by aggressive insurance underwriting. MBIA (along with Ambac) has become an aggressive insurer of asset-backed vehicles and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) structures. Year-to-date, MBIA has written insurance on $28.9 billion of CDO exposure. This compares to $13.6 billion last year, almost doubling total CDO exposure to $65.9 billion. MBIA ended 1999 with total CDO exposure of $2.3 billion. MBIA concluded the quarter with a "Global Structured Finance" "Insured Portfolio" of $167 billion. In addition to the CDOs, the company has insured about $35 billion of asset-backs, $21 billion of home equity loans, about $20 billion of other mortgage-backed, almost $20 billion Pooled Corp. Obligations & Other, and $5 billion of other "financial risk." Over at Ambac, "adjusted gross premiums written" during the quarter of $305.6 million advanced 69% from last year's third quarter. THE RETURN OF THE "TWIN DEFICITS" The White House Office of Management and Budget has recently reported a fiscal year deficit of $159 billion, a swing of $286 billion from last year's surplus. This was the first deficit since 1997 and the largest since 1995. Year-over year, spending jumped 7.9% to $2.012 trillion, while revenue dropped 6.9% to $1.853 trillion (reportedly the steepest revenue drop since 1946). Individual tax receipts declined 13.7% to $994.3 billion. Corporate tax receipts declined 2% to $148 billion. Interestingly, the four consecutive years of surplus (1998- 2001) were reported by Bloomberg News as "the longest since 1927-1930." It will be quite some time before we see another surplus, with the question being how large and how quickly the deficits balloon. As far as the external imbalances go, the U.S. trade deficit dipped slightly in September to $38.0 billion, but was still the second highest level on record. The trade gap shrank just 0.7% from the record of $38.3 billion set in August, as both imports and exports fell slightly but remained near the highest levels of the year. The September figures pushed the total trade deficit for the first nine months of 2002 to a record $317.3 billion, an increase of 17.4% from $270.3 billion in 2001. It has been widely believed that as economic growth rates abroad (notably Asia) picked up and the U.S. economy slowed, the U.S. current account would decline significantly and there would be no further external balance problems. There are two problems with this line of thought. First, we are now being told by the Treasury Secretary and various members of the Federal Reserve Board that the U.S. economy is on the threshold of recovery. Since there is nothing in the trade statistics to suggest an incipient recovery on the back of increased export growth, this implies a widening, rather than narrowing, current account deficit, since the domestic demand of many of America's leading trading partners (notably Europe, Japan and Latin America) remains sluggish. Second, even if one disputes this bullish assessment on the economy (which we do), we believe that the U.S. current account deficit will remain stubbornly high as a consequence of the lags in trade stemming from a multi-year overvaluation of the dollar, and a corresponding resistance to deterioration in their trade balances by other G-7 and emerging economies with high un-utilized resources. In addition, as the net external liabilities of the U.S. continue to mount, interest on this growing debt will cause the current account deficit to accelerate more than the trade deficit, thereby accelerating U.S. external debt growth. The U.S. economy now likely has a trend rate of growth between 2.2 to 3.0%. That is below the average real interest rate on its debt. This in turn inclines the country toward debt trap dynamics as external debt is high and the current account deficit is significant. In fact, we see the recent limited decline of the greenback as yet another stage in the long-term de-rating process of American assets. The dollar's weakness will ultimately accelerate as it comes to be recognized as the reflection of a bubble prosperity built on excess, fraud, and policy errors encouraged by a decade of cheerleading for the New Economy. This year's dollar decline suggests that the financial markets are losing their respect for U.S. policy. A loss of financial confidence is a problem that America simply cannot afford. The U.S. trade deficit is running at an annual rate of more than $400 billion and is expected to expand in the next few years to between $500 billion and $600 billion. To finance these deficits, America will have to borrow money from foreign governments and investors on an unprecedented scale, even in wartime. Coincidentally, this was also a time when gold was rising relative to the greenback. Rarely have we seen a confluence of factors so bearish for the dollar and bullish for gold, which is why we have also established our Prudent Safe Harbor Fund. SUMMARY The financial system has again come under heightened stress, and it appears perched precariously near the precipice. The marketplace may begin to "connect the dots" as investors come to appreciate the deepening stress afflicting the credit system, as well as the enormous ramifications if it stumbles. Increased attention to the vulnerabilities of GE, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Wall Street firms, credit insurers and the credit bubble evoke nervousness for any company relying on the securitization market to garner additional finance. We have reached a point where there is clearly a systemic problem, and the marketplace now has great hope that the Fed is in the process of resolving the problem. Perhaps the great credit bubble has rebounded from the brink once more. But our credit system has bubble-binge consumption and massive current account deficits to sustain. Its work is never done. The credit system has inflated (in many cases, especially California, grossly inflated) real estate prices that it must keep levitated. The credit system has unfathomable quantities of non- productive debt whose value rests on the continued issuance of massive quantities of non-productive debt. The bottom line is that the economy is today weakening in the midst of record low interest rates and unprecedented credit availability throughout the consumer sector. This could not be more ominous for a consumer/consumption-based economy, yet most are determined to ignore the dire implications. Credit conditions could not be more accommodative throughout the expansive mortgage-finance super- industry, yet housing is softening in many key markets. Spending is barely sustaining the massive retail/consumption sector that has ballooned over the protracted boom. Auto finance could not be more freely available, yet auto sales are weakening and U.S. manufacturers (and their behemoth finance subsidiaries) are in fights for their lives. And except for the fringes of sub- prime, credit card finance could today not be more readily available. Yet spending is stagnating. At the same time, the financial system remains generally flush with liquidity and the dollar is holding its own, as mortgage and auto credits are being created in record volumes. Yet the U.S. and global financial systems at times appear to be coming apart at the seams. Large quantities of increasingly weak U.S. credits are barely sustaining an unruly consumption beast with a voracious and insatiable appetite. But feeding this uncontrollable animal has been a serious mistake. He's grown big and mean. The situation is only today being recognized as unacceptably burdensome. With the financial system under stress, it is time to prepare for what appears to be an inevitable deep and protracted recession. The policy to create a mortgage finance borrowing binge until the capital spending boom could return has failed. The credit system is too impaired, chastened investors and speculators too risk-averse, and the bubble economy too maladjusted. And, the old hero, "structured finance," is indeed today's villain. Paraphrasing the great Joseph Schumpeter, people have been determined to dig in their heels and hold their ground; but the ground is about to give way. We shall continue to do our best to provide our investors a reasonable safety-net to cope with the difficult period ahead. Sincerely, /s/David W. Tice David W. Tice STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 [Enlarge/Download Table] PRUDENT BEAR PRUDENT SAFE FUND HARBOR FUND ------------ ------------ ASSETS: Investments, at value (cost $456,516,971 and $119,901,140, respectively) $472,359,298 $125,348,668 Cash 1,731,784 -- Deposit at brokers for short sales 5,794,548 -- Receivable from broker for proceeds on securities sold short 238,700,949 -- Receivable for investments sold 9,492,042 -- Receivable for futures contracts 610,875 -- Capital shares sold 18,190,910 2,938,792 Dividends receivable 109,671 -- Interest receivable 1,994,566 2,786,436 Other assets 25,548 11,094 ------------ ------------ Total Assets 749,010,191 131,084,990 ------------ ------------ LIABILITIES: Securities sold short, at value (Proceeds of $229,695,124 and $0, respectively) 195,611,566 -- Payable for securities purchased 17,253,216 1,115,480 Capital shares redeemed 6,018,327 3,555,547 Payable to Adviser 473,120 51,159 Dividends payable on short positions 187,818 -- Income distribution payable -- 209 Accrued expenses and other liabilities 594,433 171,376 ------------ ------------ Total Liabilities 220,138,480 4,893,771 ------------ ------------ NET ASSETS $528,871,711 $126,191,219 ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ NET ASSETS CONSIST OF: Capital stock $470,316,707 $118,180,596 Accumulated undistributed net investment income 5,532,116 382,114 Accumulated undistributed net realized gain (loss) on investments sold, securities sold short, option contracts expired or closed and foreign currencies (364,144) 2,094,686 Net unrealized appreciation on: Investments 15,842,327 5,447,528 Foreign currencies 2,647 86,295 Short positions 34,083,558 -- Futures contracts 3,458,500 -- ------------ ------------ TOTAL NET ASSETS $528,871,711 $126,191,219 ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ NO LOAD SHARES: Net Assets $521,029,983 $126,191,219 Shares outstanding (250,000,000 shares of $.0001 par value authorized) 62,710,598 11,315,064 Net Asset Value, Redemption Price and Offering Price Per Share $ 8.31 $ 11.15 ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ CLASS C SHARES: Net Assets $ 7,841,728 Shares outstanding (250,000,000 shares of $.0001 par value authorized) 962,921 Net Asset Value, Redemption Price and Offering Price Per Share $ 8.14 ------------ ------------ See notes to the financial statements. STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 [Enlarge/Download Table] PRUDENT BEAR PRUDENT SAFE FUND HARBOR FUND ------------ ------------ INVESTMENT INCOME: Interest income $ 7,253,399 $1,414,902 Dividend income on long positions (net of foreign taxes withheld of $76,292 and $7,055, respectively) 671,835 183,357 ------------ ---------- Total investment income 7,925,234 1,598,259 ------------ ---------- EXPENSES: Investment advisory fee 3,120,967 422,675 Administration fee 225,511 55,666 Shareholder servicing and accounting costs 387,152 116,404 Custody fees 135,555 29,180 Federal and state registration 54,892 36,681 Professional fees 84,716 59,870 Distribution expense - No Load shares 615,832 140,892 Distribution expense - Class C shares 33,416 -- Reports to shareholders 41,857 11,845 Directors' fees and expenses 4,030 2,014 Insurance expense 39,318 982 ------------ ---------- Total operating expenses before expense reductions, expense reimbursements and dividends on short positions 4,743,246 876,209 Expense reductions (See Note 5) (114,013) (1,572) Expense reimbursement from Adviser -- (30,867) Dividends on short positions (net of foreign taxes withheld of $5,387 and $0, respectively) 996,399 -- ------------ ---------- Net expenses 5,625,632 843,770 ------------ ---------- NET INVESTMENT INCOME 2,299,602 754,489 ------------ ---------- REALIZED AND UNREALIZED GAIN (LOSS) ON INVESTMENTS: Realized gain (loss) on: Long transactions 8,005,306 3,543,962 Short transactions 26,079,387 -- Option contracts expired or closed 16,921,641 -- Futures contracts closed 10,806,269 -- Foreign currency translation (1,304) 54,738 ------------ ---------- Net realized gain 61,811,299 3,598,700 ------------ ---------- Change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation on: Investments 23,382,873 4,964,260 Short positions 12,662,853 -- Futures contracts 3,495,500 -- Foreign currency 1,757 74,643 ------------ ---------- Net unrealized gain 39,542,983 5,038,903 ------------ ---------- Net realized and unrealized gain on investments 101,354,282 8,637,603 ------------ ---------- NET INCREASE IN NET ASSETS RESULTING FROM OPERATIONS $103,653,884 $9,392,092 ------------ ---------- ------------ ---------- See notes to the financial statements. STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN NET ASSETS [Enlarge/Download Table] PRUDENT BEAR FUND PRUDENT SAFE HARBOR FUND -------------------------------------- -------------------------------------- YEAR ENDED YEAR ENDED YEAR ENDED YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ OPERATIONS: Net investment income $ 2,299,602 $ 5,617,319 $ 754,489 $ 247,331 Net realized gain (loss) on: Long transactions 8,005,306 2,521,861 3,543,962 (64,065) Short transactions 26,079,387 29,542,860 -- -- Option contracts expired or closed 16,921,641 30,234,796 -- -- Futures contracts closed 10,806,269 14,142,649 -- -- Foreign currency translation (1,304) (593) 54,738 (6,131) Change in unrealized appreciation/ depreciation on: Investments 23,382,873 (9,710,424) 4,964,260 539,694 Short positions 12,662,853 14,850,790 -- -- Futures contracts 3,495,500 (1,811,495) -- -- Foreign currency 1,757 1,570 74,643 12,336 ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- Net increase in net assets resulting from operations 103,653,884 85,389,333 9,392,092 729,165 ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- DISTRIBUTIONS TO NO LOAD SHAREHOLDERS FROM NET INVESTMENT INCOME (4,724,707) (7,711,412) (1,849,472) (190,263) FROM NET REALIZED GAINS -- -- (12,167) -- ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- TOTAL DISTRIBUTIONS (4,724,707) (7,711,412) (1,861,639) (190,263) ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- DISTRIBUTIONS TO CLASS C SHAREHOLDERS FROM NET INVESTMENT INCOME (64,110) (30,803) -- -- ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- CAPITAL SHARE TRANSACTIONS: Proceeds from shares sold 877,245,442 337,595,735 226,790,135 43,865,227 Shares issued to holders in reinvestment of dividends 4,142,068 6,937,599 1,673,306 171,437 Cost of shares redeemed (636,587,023) (391,177,876) (134,136,115) (21,663,753) ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- Net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from capital share transactions 244,800,487 (46,644,542) 94,327,326 22,372,911 ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- TOTAL INCREASE IN NET ASSETS 343,665,554 31,002,576 101,857,779 22,911,813 NET ASSETS: Beginning of period 185,206,157 154,203,581 24,333,440 1,421,627 ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- End of period (including undistributed net investment income (loss) of $5,532,116, $3,603,277, $382,114, and $(9), respectively) $528,871,711 $185,206,157 $126,191,219 $24,333,440 ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- See notes to the financial statements. PRUDENT BEAR FUND FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS Selected per share data is based on a share of beneficial interest outstanding throughout each period. [Enlarge/Download Table] NO LOAD NO LOAD NO LOAD NO LOAD SHARES SHARES SHARES SHARES YEAR YEAR YEAR YEAR YEAR ENDED ENDED ENDED ENDED ENDED SEPT. 30, SEPT. 30, SEPT. 30, SEPT. 30, SEPT. 30, 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- Per Share Data: Net asset value, beginning of period $6.31 $3.93 $4.51 $7.34 $7.29 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- Income from investment operations: Net investment income(1)<F1>(2)<F2> 0.06 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.29 Net realized and unrealized gains (losses) on investments 2.08 2.44 (0.62) (2.82) (0.01) ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- Total from investment operations 2.14 2.61 (0.44) (2.63) 0.28 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- Less distributions from net investment income (0.14) (0.23) (0.14) (0.20) (0.23) ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- Net asset value, end of period $8.31 $6.31 $3.93 $4.51 $7.34 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- Total return 35.47% 68.78% -9.55% -36.17% 3.66% Supplemental data and ratios: Net assets, end of period (000's) $521,030 $183,797 $153,336 $220,462 $173,691 Ratio of net operating expenses to average net assets(3)<F3> 1.84%(4)<F4> 1.97% 1.83%(4)<F4> 1.97% 2.08% Ratio of dividends on short positions to average net assets 0.40% 0.33% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% Ratio of net investment income to average net assets 0.93% 3.68% 4.48% 4.09% 4.34% Portfolio turnover rate(5)<F5> 266.15% 386.40% 417.53% 536.56% 480.25% (1)<F1> Net investment income per share before dividends on short positions for the No Load Shares for the periods ended September 30, 2002, September 30, 2001, September 30, 2000, September 30, 1999 and September 30, 1998 was $0.08, $0.19, $0.19, $0.21 and $0.30, respectively. (2)<F2> Net investment income per share represents net investment income divided by the average shares outstanding throughout the period. (3)<F3> The net operating expense ratio excludes dividends on short positions. The ratio including dividends on short positions for the No Load Shares for the periods ended September 30, 2002, September 30, 2001, September 30, 2000, September 30, 1999 and September 30, 1998 was 2.24%, 2.30%, 2.11%, 2.25% and 2.36%, respectively. (4)<F4> The net operating expense ratio includes expense reductions for soft dollar credits. The ratio excluding expense reductions for the No Load Shares for the periods ended September 30, 2002 and September 30, 2000 were 1.89% and 1.93%, respectively. (5)<F5> Portfolio turnover is calculated on the basis of the Fund as a whole without distinguishing between the classes of shares issued. See notes to the financial statements. PRUDENT BEAR FUND FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS Selected per share data is based on a share of beneficial interest outstanding throughout each period. [Enlarge/Download Table] CLASS C SHARES CLASS C SHARES CLASS C SHARES CLASS C SHARES FEB. 8, 1999(1)<F6> YEAR ENDED YEAR ENDED YEAR ENDED THROUGH SEPT. 30, 2002 SEPT. 30, 2001 SEPT. 30, 2000 SEPT. 30, 1999 -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- Per Share Data: Net asset value, beginning of period $6.23 $3.88 $4.49 $4.78 ----- ----- ----- ----- Income from investment operations: Net investment income(2)<F7>(3)<F8> 0.01 0.14 0.15 0.09 Net realized and unrealized gains (losses) on investments 2.03 2.40 (0.62) (0.38) ----- ----- ----- ----- Total from investment operations 2.04 2.54 (0.47) (0.29) ----- ----- ----- ----- Less distributions from net investment income (0.13) (0.19) (0.14) -- ----- ----- ----- ----- Net asset value, end of period $8.14 $6.23 $3.88 $4.49 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- Total return 34.18% 67.41% -10.33% -6.07%(4)<F9> Supplemental data and ratios: Net assets, end of period (000's) $7,842 $1,409 $868 $207 Ratio of net operating expenses to average net assets(5)<F10> 2.59%(6)<F11> 2.72% 2.58%(6)<F11> 2.74%(7)<F12> Ratio of dividends on short positions to average net assets 0.40% 0.33% 0.28% 0.32%(7)<F12> Ratio of net investment income to average net assets 0.18% 2.93% 3.73% 3.25%(7)<F12> Portfolio turnover rate(8)<F13> 266.15% 386.40% 417.53% 536.56% (1)<F6> Commencement of operations. (2)<F7> Net investment income per share before dividends on short positions for the Class C Shares for the periods ended September 30, 2002, September 30, 2001, September 30, 2000 and September 30, 1999 was $0.04, $0.16, $0.15 and $0.09, respectively. (3)<F8> Net investment income per share represents net investment income divided by the average shares outstanding throughout the period. (4)<F9> Not annualized. (5)<F10> The net operating expense ratio excludes dividends on short positions. The ratio including dividends on short positions for the Class C Shares for the periods ended September 30, 2002, September 30, 2001, September 30, 2000 and September 30, 1999 was 2.99%, 3.05%, 2.86% and 3.06%, respectively. (6)<F11> The net operating expense ratio includes expense reductions for soft dollar credits. The ratio excluding expense reductions for the Class C Shares for the periods ended September 30, 2002 and September 30, 2000 were 2.64% and 2.68%, respectively. (7)<F12> Annualized. (8)<F13> Portfolio turnover is calculated on the basis of the Fund as a whole without distinguishing between the classes of shares issued. See notes to the financial statements. PRUDENT SAFE HARBOR FUND FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS Selected per share data is based on a share of beneficial interest outstanding throughout each period. [Enlarge/Download Table] FEBRUARY 2, 2000(1)<F14> YEAR ENDED YEAR ENDED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ Per Share Data: Net asset value, beginning of period $ 9.31 $9.19 $10.00 ------ ----- ------ Income from investment operations: Net investment income 0.14(2)<F15> 0.20(3)<F16> 0.24(3)<F16> Net realized and unrealized gains (losses) on investments 1.94 0.03 (0.90) ------ ----- ------ Total from investment operations 2.08 0.23 (0.66) ------ ----- ------ Less distributions: Dividends from net investment income (0.23) (0.11) (0.15) Distributions from net realized gains (0.01) -- -- ------ ----- ------ Total distributions (0.24) (0.11) (0.15) ------ ----- ------ Net asset value, end of period $11.15 $9.31 $ 9.19 ------ ----- ------ ------ ----- ------ Total return 22.54% 2.54% -6.60%(4)<F17> Supplemental data and ratios: Net assets, end of period (000's) $126,191 $24,333 $1,422 Ratio of net operating expenses to average net assets(6)<F19> 1.50%(7)<F20> 1.50% 1.80%(5)<F18> Ratio of net investment income to average net assets 1.34% 2.26% 3.77%(5)<F18> Portfolio turnover rate 81.58% 133.50% 180.29% (1)<F14> Commencement of operations. (2)<F15> Net investment income per share is calculated using ending balances prior to consideration of adjustments for permanent book and tax differences. (3)<F16> Net investment income per share represents net investment income divided by the average shares outstanding throughout the period. (4)<F17> Not annualized. (5)<F18> Annualized. (6)<F19> Without expense reimbursements of $30,867, $150,320 and $116,925 for the periods ended September 30, 2002, September 30, 2001, and September 30, 2000, the ratio of operating expenses to average net assets would have been 1.55%, 2.87%, and 25.91%, respectively. (7)<F20> The net operating expense ratio includes expense reductions for soft dollar credits. The ratio excluding expense reductions for the period ended September 30, 2002 was 1.50%. See notes to the financial statements. PRUDENT BEAR FUND SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 SHARES VALUE ------ ----- COMMON STOCKS -- 16.0%*<F21> AEROSPACE -- 0.2%*<F21> 20,000 Lockheed Martin Corporation $ 1,293,400 ------------ AGRICULTURAL -- 0.0%*<F21> 20,000 United Grain Growers Ltd.(3)<F26> 77,166 ------------ BASIC MATERIALS -- 11.9%*<F21> 1,333,334 Alamos Minerals Ltd. (Acquired 7/11/2002, Cost $113,167)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 300,088 700,000 Alamos Minerals Ltd. (Acquired 7/19/2002, Cost $116,270)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 157,546 500,000 Alamos Minerals Ltd. (Acquired 7/22/2002, Cost $122,146)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 112,533 230,000 Almaden Minerals Ltd. (Acquired 4/02/2002, Cost $61,350)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 80,113 800,000 Altius Minerals Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26>(7)<F30> 716,177 55,000 ASA Ltd.(3)<F26> 1,774,850 130,000 Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd. - ADR**<F22>(3)<F26> 738,400 222,225 Atacama Minerals Corp. (Acquired 5/22/2002, Cost $128,889)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 65,496 780,000 Aurizon Mines Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 590,090 100,000 Aurora Platinum Corp. (Acquired 9/03/2002, Cost $234,484)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 182,196 663,600 Banro Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 1,673,433 140,000 Banro Corporation (Acquired 3/18/2002, Cost $114,465)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 300,088 80,000 Banro Corporation (Acquired 5/10/2002, Cost $185,822)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 171,479 500,000 Birch Mountain Resources Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 66,196 884,874 Black Hawk Mining Inc.**<F22>(3)<F26> 66,943 97,740 Campbell Resources Inc.**<F22>(3)<F26> 32,254 5,362,000 Canarc Resource Corp.**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 1,605,693 765,700 Candente Resource Corp. (Acquired 5/14/2001, Cost $96,172)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 183,436 1,570,000 Candente Resource Corp. (Acquired 1/30/2002, Cost $134,300)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 376,119 270,000 Candente Resource Corp. (Acquired 5/16/2002, Cost $58,950)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 57,874 1,060,976 Canyon Resources Corporation**<F22>(7)<F30> 2,121,952 1,502,200 Chesapeake Gold Corp.**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 1,846,734 30,000 Crystallex International Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> 68,700 180,300 Cumberland Resources Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 407,478 310,000 Donner Minerals Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 19,544 73,700 Dundee Precious Metals, Inc. - Class A**<F22>(3)<F26> 792,198 317,500 Durban Roodepoort Deep Limited - ADR**<F22>(3)<F26> 1,320,800 8,378,800 Dynatec Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 4,014,556 6,415,060 ECU Silver Mining Inc.**<F22>(3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> 242,658 500,000 East West Resource Corporation (Acquired 5/13/2002, Cost $27,250)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 34,832 1,631,000 Eldorado Gold Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> 1,501,236 2,000,000 Excellon Resources, Inc. (Acquired 5/15/2002, Cost $165,776)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 139,327 33 Exploration Capital Partners, LP (Acquired 10/14/1998, Cost $660,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 1,454,272 15 Exploration Capital Partners, LP (Acquired 12/20/2000, Cost $300,020)(4)<F27> r<F23> 541,269 670,000 Farallon Resources Ltd. (Acquired 4/12/2002, Cost $119,715)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 114,891 150,000 Foxpoint Resources Ltd. (Acquired 12/14/2001, Cost $124,050)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 164,781 367,040 Glamis Gold Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 3,408,460 236,800 Glamis Gold Stock Purchase Rights (Acquired 7/17/2002, Cost $0)**<F22>(3)<F26> (4)<F27> 0 322,000 Glencairn Explorations Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 101,500 225,000 Goldcorp Inc.(3)<F26> 2,481,750 800,000 Golden Goliath Resources Ltd. (Acquired 10/06/2000, Cost $260,777)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 102,887 1,600,000 Golden Phoenix Minerals, Inc. (Acquired 3/01/2002, Cost $144,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> r<F23> 421,600 33,500 Golden Queen Mining Co. Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 14,784 1,512,500 Golden Star Resources Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 1,890,625 500,000 Golden Star Resources Ltd. (Acquired 12/19/2001, Cost $242,500)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 531,250 110,000 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited - ADR(3)<F26> 1,721,500 1,000,000 IMA Exploration Inc. (Acquired 12/18/2001, Cost $236,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 267,936 637,000 IMA Exploration Inc. (Acquired 1/29/2002, Cost $148,815)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 170,675 222,222 IMA Exploration Inc. (Acquired 5/23/2002, Cost $61,473)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 59,541 531,915 IMA Exploration Inc. (Acquired 9/23/2002, Cost $156,030)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 142,519 3,315,000 International Uranium Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> 710,566 2,525,000 Kenor ASA**<F22>(3)<F26> 1,028,971 3,500,000 Madison Enterprises Corp. (Acquired 3/21/2002, Cost $204,500)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 300,088 990,738 Maxam Gold Corporation**<F22>(4)<F27> (6)<F29> 19,815 130,000 Meridian Gold Inc.**<F22>(3)<F26> (5)<F28> 2,379,000 350,000 Metalline Mining Co. Inc.**<F22>(7)<F30> 455,000 100,000 Metalline Mining Co. Inc. (Acquired 6/28/2000, Cost $325,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 117,000 250,000 Metalline Mining Co. Inc. (Acquired 6/29/2001, Cost $498,750)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 276,250 150,000 Minefinders Corporation Ltd. (Acquired 3/21/2002, Cost $217,665)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 458,170 833,333 Minera Andes Inc. (Acquired 6/21/2002, Cost $78,209)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 178,624 946,300 Miramar Mining Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> 889,522 501,000 Nevada Pacific Gold Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 142,132 1,000,000 Nevada Pacific Gold Ltd. (Acquired 12/04/2001, Cost $154,600)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 251,860 500,000 Nevada Pacific Gold Ltd. (Acquired 5/23/2002, Cost $175,500)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 125,930 1,007,500 Nevsun Resources Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 762,199 41,400 Newmont Mining Corporation 1,138,914 1,919,450 Orezone Resources Inc. (Acquired 7/19/2002, Cost $245,353)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 339,431 3,750,000 Orezone Resources Inc. (Acquired 7/19/2002, Cost $490,500)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 663,141 201,399 Pan American Silver Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> 1,238,402 542,500 Pelangio Mines Inc.**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 44,462 3,000,000 Pelangio Mines Inc. (Acquired 2/08/2002, Cost $253,100)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 176,838 1,500,000 Pelangio Mines Inc. (Acquired 5/15/2002, Cost $193,635)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 88,419 1,514,500 Platinum Group Metals Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 572,879 40,000 Randgold & Exploration Company Limited**<F22>(3)<F26> 215,520 17,500 Randgold Resources Limited - ADR**<F22>(3)<F26> 316,558 1,000,000 Redstar Gold Corp. (Acquired 5/31/2002, Cost $77,550)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 96,457 368,800 Repadre Capital Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> 1,964,670 3,400,000 Riddarhyttan Resources AB**<F22>(3)<F26> 1,118,361 220,000 Rimfire Minerals Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 58,252 1,000,000 Rimfire Minerals Corporation (Acquired 4/15/2002, Cost $244,120)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 225,066 2,970,000 Rio Narcea Gold Mines Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 2,808,599 625,000 Ross River Minerals Inc. (Acquired 5/21/2002, Cost $93,750)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 33,492 70,000 SAMEX Mining Corp.**<F22>(3)<F26> 11,474 2,000,000 SAMEX Mining Corp. (Acquired 3/05/2002, Cost $170,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 278,653 75,000 Silver Standard Resources Inc. (Acquired 5/10/2002, Cost $187,500)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 260,032 1,000,000 Silverado Gold Mines Ltd. (Acquired 5/06/2002, Cost $90,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 408,000 6,000,000 South American Gold and Copper Company Limited (Acquired 6/15/2001 & 7/12/2002, Cost $293,974)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 144,875 3,500,000 South American Gold and Copper Company Limited (Acquired 3/28/2002, Cost $115,875)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 84,510 238,600 Southwestern Resources Corp.**<F22>(3)<F26> 421,183 906,263 Starfield Resources Inc.**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 194,256 762,025 Starfield Resources Inc. (Acquired 6/22/2001, Cost $296,190)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 138,838 1,001,000 Starfield Resources Inc. (Acquired 10/10/2001, Cost $314,995)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 182,379 1,333,333 Sultan Minerals Inc. (Acquired 8/13/2001, Cost $128,333)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 150,044 1,000,000 Sultan Minerals Inc. (Acquired 1/18/2002, Cost $174,500)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 112,533 58,048 TVX Gold Inc.**<F22>(3) 823,121 650,000 Tyhee Development Corp. (Acquired 5/01/2002, Cost $106,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 146,293 749,500 Virginia Gold Mines, Inc.**<F22>(3)<F26> 529,214 2,432,800 Western Copper Holdings Limited**<F22>(3)<F26> (7)<F30> 4,306,056 125,000 Wheaton River Minerals Ltd. (Acquired 5/30/2002, Cost $93,163)**<F22>(2)<F25> (3)<F26> (4)<F27> r<F23> 75,692 300,000 X-Cal Resources Ltd.**<F22>(3)<F26> 111,587 835,000 Xenolix Technologies, Inc.**<F22> 8,350 1,000,000 Xenolix Technologies, Inc. (Acquired 3/07/2000, Cost $749,600)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> r<F23> 9,500 1,000,000 Xenolix Technologies, Inc. (Acquired 3/30/2001, Cost $499,200)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> r<F23> 8,500 400,000 Xenolix Technologies, Inc. (Acquired 2/04/2002, Cost $98,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> r<F23> 3,400 ------------ 62,954,337 ------------ CHEMICALS -- 0.1%*<F21> 65,000 Methanex Corporation(3)<F26> 557,050 89,250 Pioneer Companies, Inc.**<F22> 9 ------------ 557,059 ------------ CONSUMER -- 0.0%*<F21> 7,500 Enesco Group, Inc.**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 52,575 ------------ HEALTH CARE -- 1.8%*<F21> 5,300 Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 88,086 212,500 AP Pharma, Inc.**<F22> 289,425 193,727 Avigen, Inc.**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 1,536,255 10,200 Bentley Pharmaceuticals, Inc.**<F22> 86,700 1,390,966 Cardima, Inc.**<F22>(7)<F30> 1,168,411 2,187,931 Cardima, Inc. (Acquired 5/02/2001, Cost $1,159,603)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 1,562,183 393,701 Cardima, Inc. (Acquired 8/09/2001, Cost $480,315)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 281,103 1,041,666 Cardima, Inc. (Acquired 8/05/2002, Cost $746,875)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 743,750 369,000 Generex Biotechnology Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> 398,520 290,780 InSite Vision Incorporated**<F22> 360,567 143,712 InSite Vision Incorporated (Acquired 4/28/2000, Cost $599,947)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> r<F23> 157,005 10,000 InterMune Inc.**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 328,200 389,741 IRIDEX Corporation**<F22>(7)<F30> 1,286,145 206,500 Neurobiological Technologies, Inc.**<F22> 605,045 289,299 NexMed, Inc.**<F22> 532,310 6,000 Penwest Pharmaceuticals Co.**<F22> 49,980 50,000 TriPath Imaging, Inc.**<F22> 112,500 ------------ 9,586,185 ------------ MACHINERY -- 0.3%*<F21> 260,900 Lancer Corporation**<F22> 1,643,670 ------------ OIL AND GAS -- 0.3%*<F21> 50,000 BP Prudhoe Bay Royalty Trust 724,500 8,000 Imperial Oil Ltd.(3)<F26> 232,000 8,361 KCS Energy, Inc.**<F22>(5)<F28> 12,542 100,000 KeyWest Energy Corporation**<F22>(3)<F26> 173,370 100,000 The Meridian Resource Corporation**<F22> 211,000 24,000 Williams Coal Seam Gas Royalty Trust 202,560 ------------ 1,555,972 ------------ POLLUTION CONTROL -- 0.3%*<F21> 686,500 KleenAir Systems, Inc.**<F22>(7)<F30> 514,875 1,000,000 KleenAir Systems, Inc. (Acquired 1/25/2002 & 2/12/2002, Cost $900,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 637,500 1,000,000 KleenAir Systems, Inc. (Acquired 7/19/2002, Cost $500,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 637,500 ------------ 1,789,875 ------------ TECHNOLOGY -- 0.5%*<F21> 9,604,200 Aura Systems, Inc.**<F22>(7)<F30> 739,523 500,000 Aura Systems, Inc. (Acquired 12/08/1999, Cost $135,000) )**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 36,600 12,500,000 Aura Systems, Inc. (Acquired 5/02/2002, Cost $2,500,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> (7)<F30> r<F23> 818,750 1,000 Broadcom Corporation - Class A**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 10,680 85,000 ESS Technology, Inc.**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 522,750 300 Junum Inc. (Acquired 2/19/1998, Cost $87,000)**<F22>(2)<F25> (4)<F27> r<F23> 2 14,000 RF Micro Devices, Inc.**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 84,000 100,000 SoftNet Systems, Inc.**<F22> 230,000 3,000 VeriSign, Inc.**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 15,150 ------------ 2,457,455 ------------ TELECOMMUNICATIONS -- 0.0%*<F21> 24,000 LightPath Technologies, Inc. - Class A**<F22>(1)<F24> (5)<F28> 9,360 75,000 WorldQuest Networks, Inc.**<F22> 139,500 ------------ 148,860 ------------ TEXTILE -- 0.4%*<F21> 742,600 Cone Mills Corporation**<F22> 1,834,222 ------------ TRANSPORTATION -- 0.1%*<F21> 250 Crowley Maritime Corporation**<F22>(4)<F27> 312,500 ------------ UTILITIES -- 0.1%*<F21> 15,000 California Water Service Group 382,950 25,000 NewPower Holdings, Inc.**<F22> 938 ------------ 383,888 ------------ TOTAL COMMON STOCKS (Cost $88,704,565) 84,647,164 ------------ CONTRACTS (100 SHARES PER CONTRACT) ----------------------------------- CALL OPTIONS PURCHASED -- 0.2%*<F21> AngloGold Limited - ADR: 250 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 12,500 ASA Ltd.: 250 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 40,625 Goldcorp Inc.: 800 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $10.00 106,000 500 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $12.50 32,500 500 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $11.25 87,500 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $70.00 33,000 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited - ADR: 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $15.00 63,750 Household International, Inc.: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 24,500 iShares Dow Jones U.S. Financial Sector Index Fund: 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $65.00 70,000 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 52,500 Morgan Stanley: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 40,500 Nasdaq-100 Index Tracking Stock: 3,000 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 420,000 Newmont Mining Corporation: 400 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $27.50 108,000 Placer Dome Inc.: 1,500 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $10.00 101,250 500 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $12.50 11,250 ------------ TOTAL CALL OPTIONS (Cost $1,830,709) 1,203,875 ------------ PUT OPTIONS PURCHASED -- 6.9%*<F21> Adolph Coors Company - Class B: 100 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $65.00 88,500 100 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $55.00 40,000 Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. - Class A: 550 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $35.00 121,000 Alliance Data Systems Corporation: 30 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $17.50 9,000 Allied Capital Corporation: 150 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 33,750 Ambac Financial Group, Inc.: 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 23,500 700 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 164,500 410 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $55.00 166,050 American Express Company: 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 43,000 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 166,000 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $30.00 58,000 American International Group, Inc.: 500 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 53,750 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 33,000 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 22,000 500 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $55.00 195,000 American Standard Companies Inc.: 100 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $70.00 72,500 Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc.: 600 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 169,500 AutoNation, Inc.: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $15.00 70,000 Bank of America Corporation: 500 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 65,000 400 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 25,000 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 70,500 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $65.00 85,000 The Bank of New York Company, Inc.: 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $27.50 50,250 BB&T Corporation: 300 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 64,500 BellSouth Corporation: 250 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 54,375 Biogen, Inc.: 150 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 90,750 The Black & Decker Corporation: 60 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 11,400 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 43,000 The Boeing Company: 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 75,000 Boyd Gaming Corporation: 600 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $17.50 94,500 Brunswick Corporation: 70 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 12,775 100 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 32,000 570 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 283,750 Business Objects S.A. - ADR: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 287,000 Cabot Microelectronics Corporation: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 20,250 250 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $35.00 136,250 Carnival Corporation: 250 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 26,875 CDW Computer Centers, Inc.: 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 61,000 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 85,500 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $45.00 139,000 Centex Corporation: 150 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 92,250 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $45.00 115,000 CenturyTel, Inc.: 600 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $25.00 246,000 Cisco Systems, Inc.: 1,500 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $12.50 318,750 350 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $15.00 157,500 300 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $12.50 84,000 Citigroup Inc.: 300 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $27.50 63,000 Clayton Homes, Inc.: 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $15.00 40,000 320 Expiration February 2003 Exercise Price $12.50 76,800 Computer Sciences Corporation: 250 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 49,375 Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc.: 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 16,000 500 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 41,250 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 82,000 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $45.00 90,000 Cox Communications, Inc. - Class A: 300 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 97,500 DIANON Systems, Inc.: 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 12,000 Dillard's, Inc. - Class A: 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 18,250 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 65,000 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 157,500 Dominion Resources, Inc.: 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $55.00 143,000 Doral Financial Corp.: 45 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 4,219 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $23.38 45,750 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 23,000 85 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $26.63 42,075 100 Expiration February 2003 Exercise Price $26.63 63,750 Eastman Kodak Company: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 57,500 eBay Inc.: 150 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 10,875 Eli Lilly and Company: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 7,000 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 37,500 100 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $50.00 33,500 ESS Technology, Inc.: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $15.00 265,500 250 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $17.50 283,750 Ethan Allen Interiors Inc.: 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 13,250 375 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 138,750 200 Expiration February 2003 Exercise Price $30.00 49,000 Fannie Mae: 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $55.00 97,500 400 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 244,000 250 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $70.00 300,000 Federated Department Stores, Inc.: 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $37.50 81,500 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 106,500 300 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $32.50 148,500 Financial Select Sector SPDR Fund: 500 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $23.00 136,250 Freddie Mac: 500 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 41,250 1,300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $55.00 266,500 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 188,000 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 50,250 100 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $60.00 70,000 GATX Corporation: 220 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 56,100 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 121,000 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 212,000 General Electric Company: 1,000 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $27.50 400,000 General Motors Corporation: 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 160,000 100 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 215,500 Gentex Corporation: 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 76,000 Golden West Financial Corporation: 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $55.00 9,250 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 20,750 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.: 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $70.00 200,000 The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 273,000 GreenPoint Financial Corp.: 70 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 1,575 100 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 12,250 100 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 41,000 Harley-Davidson, Inc.: 130 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 16,575 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 73,500 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 96,000 Harman International Industries, Incorporated: 40 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 900 Household International, Inc.: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 234,000 H&R Block, Inc.: 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $45.00 142,000 Ingersoll-Rand Company - Class A: 150 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $42.50 128,250 InterMune Inc.: 500 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $17.50 20,000 International Business Machines Corporation: 250 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 101,250 800 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $65.00 604,000 Iron Mountain Incorporated: 20 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 2,350 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 204,000 570 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $25.00 141,075 350 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $30.00 190,750 iShares Dow Jones U.S. Financial Sector Index Fund: 600 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 121,500 400 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $65.00 156,000 400 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $70.00 270,000 800 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $75.00 856,000 KB HOME: 100 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 3,000 175 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 24,500 Kinder Morgan, Inc.: 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $35.00 80,000 Kohl's Corporation: 100 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 27,000 900 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $65.00 481,500 50 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $70.00 46,750 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 82,000 500 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $60.00 287,500 100 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $65.00 81,500 L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc.: 250 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $47.50 19,375 Lamar Advertising Company: 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 388,000 100 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $30.00 35,000 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: 600 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 160,500 Lowe's Companies, Inc.: 250 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $37.50 19,375 250 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 56,875 Mandalay Resort Group: 240 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $27.50 18,600 Marriott International, Inc. - Class A: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 46,500 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 330,000 MBIA Inc.: 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 117,000 350 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 351,750 MBNA Corporation: 300 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $17.50 54,000 McKesson Corporation: 150 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 41,250 150 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $32.50 75,000 Mentor Corporation: 400 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $30.00 120,000 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.: 700 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 199,500 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 214,500 MGIC Investment Corporation: 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 203,000 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $55.00 290,000 70 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $45.00 49,350 MGM MIRAGE: 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 36,500 320 Expiration March 2003 Exercise Price $30.00 44,000 Moody's Corporation: 180 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 9,450 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 38,250 Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc.: 170 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 15,725 Newell Rubbermaid Inc.: 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 47,250 500 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $32.50 160,000 100 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 48,000 300 Expiration March 2003 Exercise Price $32.50 117,000 NIKE, Inc. - Class B: 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $42.50 66,750 Pixelworks, Inc.: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $10.00 145,500 PNC Financial Services Group: 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $37.50 41,250 Polaris Industries Inc.: 170 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 79,900 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $65.00 140,000 Precision Castparts Corp.: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 44,250 QLogic Corporation: 50 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 69,000 QUALCOMM Inc: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 10,500 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 30,000 300 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $25.00 84,750 Radian Group Inc.: 195 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 28,763 250 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 193,750 Reebok International Ltd. 20 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 2,250 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $25.00 48,000 150 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $27.50 57,000 Rent-A-Center, Inc.: 160 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 52,800 100 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 38,000 Rohm and Haas Company: 150 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 58,500 Ruby Tuesday, Inc.: 350 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $17.50 19,250 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 66,000 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 75,000 150 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $17.50 21,000 Sabre Holdings Corporation: 70 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 74,550 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 157,000 SBC Communications Inc.: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 38,250 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 160,500 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $22.50 84,000 Sears, Roebuck and Co.: 100 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 64,500 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 333,000 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $45.00 161,000 100 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $50.00 118,500 Semiconductor HOLDRs Trust: 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $27.50 249,000 150 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 162,000 The Sherwin-Williams Company: 500 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 156,250 Silicon Valley Bancshares: 400 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 140,000 Software HOLDRs Trust: 400 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 100,000 Sonic Automotive, Inc.: 150 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 184,500 Stage Stores, Inc.: 70 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 58,100 The Standard & Poor's 100 Index: 1,500 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $385.00 1,072,500 1,150 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $400.00 1,334,000 250 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $440.00 898,750 150 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $410.00 363,750 400 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $420.00 1,412,000 550 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $440.00 2,607,000 400 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $460.00 2,468,000 Starbucks Corporation: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 13,500 Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.: 100 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 36,500 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 156,000 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 253,000 300 Expiration February 2003 Exercise Price $25.00 157,500 SunGard Data Systems Inc.: 50 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $20.00 14,500 SunTrust Banks, Inc.: 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $60.00 78,000 TECO Energy, Inc.: 300 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 207,000 Teradyne, Inc.: 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $17.50 318,000 Terex Corporation: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 64,000 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $22.50 226,000 300 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $20.00 117,000 Texas Instruments Incorporated: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 106,000 3M Co.: 500 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $115.00 355,000 400 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $105.00 192,000 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $100.00 122,000 Tiffany & Co.: 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 274,000 Toll Brothers, Inc.: 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 88,000 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $25.00 92,000 Trimeris, Inc.: 150 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 36,375 200 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $40.00 77,000 Union Pacific Corporation: 250 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 95,000 United Parcel Service, Inc. - Class B: 400 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $60.00 26,000 500 Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $60.00 112,500 Varian Semiconductor Equipment Associates, Inc.: 150 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 204,000 Verizon Communications Inc.: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $25.00 15,000 500 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 165,000 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 67,500 600 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 219,000 Washington Mutual, Inc.: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $37.50 120,000 Wells Fargo & Company: 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $40.00 3,750 300 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 18,750 Whirlpool Corporation: 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $45.00 58,000 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 129,000 Xilinx, Inc.: 200 Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $15.00 42,000 The Yankee Candle Company, Inc.: 228 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $20.00 67,260 York International Corporation: 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 58,000 200 Expiration November 2002 Exercise Price $35.00 139,000 20 Expiration February 2003 Exercise Price $30.00 7,200 Yum! Brands, Inc.: 200 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $30.00 53,000 Zions Bancorporation: 650 Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $50.00 425,750 ------------ TOTAL PUT OPTIONS (Cost $21,086,492) 36,468,092 ------------ SHARES ------ PREFERRED STOCK -- 0.6%*<F21> 28,200 Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc. - Series Gold**<F22> 798,060 109,900 Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc. - Series Silver**<F22> 890,190 57,000 Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc. - Series II**<F22> 1,419,300 200 KCS Energy, Inc. (Acquired 2/20/2001, Cost $200,000)**<F22>(4)<F27> r<F23> 200,000 ------------ TOTAL PREFERRED STOCK (Cost $3,202,486) 3,307,550 ------------ WARRANTS -- 0.8%*<F21> 1,333,334 Alamos Minerals Ltd. Expiration April 2003 Exercise Price $0.20 CN (Acquired 7/11/2002, Cost $13,333)(4)<F27> r<F23> 131,972 500,000 Alamos Minerals Ltd. Expiration July 2003 Exercise Price $0.45 CN (Acquired 7/22/2002, Cost $5,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 3,152 700,000 Alamos Minerals Ltd. Expiration July 2004 Exercise Price $0.28 CN (Acquired 7/19/2002, Cost $7,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 33,981 165,000 Almaden Minerals Ltd. Expiration April 2004 Exercise Price $0.51 CN (Acquired 4/02/2002, Cost $1,650)(4)<F27> r<F23> 4,421 12,500 Apex Silver Mines Limited Expiration February 2004 Exercise Price $18.00 (Acquired 11/03/1999, Cost $13)(4)<F27> r<F23> 13 93,750 Apollo Gold Corporation Expiration March 2004 Exercise Price $1.60 (Acquired 7/12/2002, Cost $938)(4)<F27> r<F23> 938 66,666 Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd. - ADR Expiration April 2004 Exercise Price $3.00 (Acquired 4/29/2002, Cost $147,332)(4)<F27> r<F23> 121,865 66,667 Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd. - ADR Expiration October 2004 Exercise Price $3.00 (Acquired 4/29/2002, Cost $147,334)(4)<F27> r<F23> 121,867 66,667 Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd. - ADR Expiration April 2005 Exercise Price $3.00 (Acquired 4/29/2002, Cost $147,334)(4)<F27> r<F23> 121,867 111,112 Atacama Minerals Corp. Expiration May 2003 Exercise Price $1.10 CN (Acquired 5/22/2002, Cost $1,111)(4)<F27> r<F23> 700 100,000 Aurora Platinum Corp. Expiration September 2003 Exercise Price $4.75 CN (Acquired 9/03/2002, Cost $1,000) (4)<F27> r<F23> 630 1,785 Avigen, Inc. Expiration November 2004 Exercise Price $28.00 (Acquired 11/11/1999, Cost $223)(4)<F27> r<F23> 2 135,000 Candente Resource Corp. Expiration May 2003 Exercise Price $0.44 CN (Acquired 5/16/2002, Cost $1,350)(4)<F27> r<F23> 851 1,570,000 Candente Resource Corp. Expiration January 2004 Exercise Price $0.20 CN (Acquired 1/30/2002, Cost $15,700)(4)<F27> r<F23> 197,957 196,850 Cardima, Inc. Expiration August 2005 Exercise Price $1.91 (Acquired 8/09/2001, Cost $19,685)(4)<F27> r<F23> 19,685 312,499 Cardima, Inc. Expiration August 2006 Exercise Price $0.90 (Acquired 8/05/2002, Cost $3,125)(4)<F27> r<F23> 3,125 1,000,000 Desert Sun Mining Corp. Expiration August 2004 Exercise Price $0.50 CN (Acquired 8/26/2002, Cost $257,500)(4)<F27> r<F23> 305,825 500,000 East West Resource Corporation Expiration May 2004 Exercise Price $0.13 CN (Acquired 5/13/2002, Cost $5,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 3,152 670,000 Farallon Resources Ltd. Expiration April 2004 Exercise Price $0.40 CN (Acquired 4/12/2002, Cost $6,700)(4)<F27> r<F23> 4,224 75,000 Foxpoint Resources Ltd. Expiration December 2003 Exercise Price $1.30 CN (Acquired 12/14/2001, Cost $750)(4)<F27> r<F23> 35,462 800,000 Golden Goliath Resources Ltd. Expiration October 2002 Exercise Price $0.75 CN (Acquired 10/06/2000, Cost $5,322)(4)<F27> r<F23> 0 1,600,000 Golden Phoenix Minerals, Inc. Expiration March 2004 Exercise Price $0.10 (Acquired 3/01/2002, Cost $16,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 285,600 250,000 Golden Star Resources Ltd. Expiration December 2003 Exercise Price $0.70 (Acquired 12/19/2001, Cost $2,500)(4)<F27> r<F23> 116,875 500,000 IMA Exploration Inc. Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $0.45 CN (Acquired 12/18/2001, Cost $5,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 15,761 318,500 IMA Exploration Inc. Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $0.45 CN (Acquired 1/29/2002, Cost $3,185)(4)<F27> r<F23> 10,040 222,222 IMA Exploration Inc. Expiration May 2004 Exercise Price $0.53 CN (Acquired 5/23/2002, Cost $2,222)(4)<F27> r<F23> 1,401 265,958 IMA Exploration Inc. Expiration September 2004 Exercise Price $0.55 CN (Acquired 9/23/2002, Cost $2,660)(4)<F27> r<F23> 1,677 50,299 InSite Vision Incorporated Expiration April 2004 Exercise Price $5.64 (Acquired 4/28/2000, Cost $50)(4)<F27> r<F23> 50 1,750,000 Madison Enterprises Corp. Expiration September 2003 Exercise Price $0.12 CN (Acquired 3/21/2002, Cost $17,500)(4)<F27> r<F23> 17,652 125,000 Metalline Mining Co. Inc. Expiration June 2006 Exercise Price $5.00 (Acquired 6/29/2001, Cost $1,250)(4)<F27> r<F23> 1,250 202,909 Minefinders Corporation Ltd. Expiration September 2002 Exercise Price $1.35 CN (Acquired 9/27/2000, Cost $20,291)(4)<F27> r<F23> 472,990 335,755 Minefinders Corporation Ltd. Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $1.00 CN (Acquired 1/05/2001, Cost $33,576)(4)<F27> r<F23> 845,632 133,896 Minefinders Corporation Ltd. Expiration July 2003 Exercise Price $1.40 CN (Acquired 6/22/2001, Cost $1,339)(4)<F27> r<F23> 308,530 110,514 Minefinders Corporation Ltd. Expiration September 2003 Exercise Price $1.40 CN (Acquired 9/26/2001, Cost $1,105)(4)<F27> r<F23> 254,652 416,666 Minera Andes Inc. Expiration June 2003 Exercise Price $0.25 CN (Acquired 6/21/2002, Cost $4,167)(4)<F27> r<F23> 23,641 87,500 Neurobiological Technologies, Inc. Expiration February 2004 Exercise Price $1.38 (Acquired 11/05/1999, Cost $88)(4)<F27> r<F23> 103,250 500,000 Nevada Pacific Gold Ltd. Expiration December 2002 Exercise Price $0.30 CN (Acquired 12/04/2001, Cost $5,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 53,587 250,000 Nevada Pacific Gold Ltd. Expiration May 2003 Exercise Price $0.70 CN (Acquired 5/23/2002, Cost $2,500)(4)<F27> r<F23> 1,576 464,699 Orezone Resources Inc. Expiration July 2004 Exercise Price $0.30 CN (Acquired 7/19/2002, Cost $4,647)(4)<F27> r<F23> 2,930 3,000,000 Pelangio Mines Inc. Expiration February 2003 Exercise Price $0.20 CN (Acquired 2/08/2002, Cost $30,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 18,913 1,000,000 Redstar Gold Corp. Expiration May 2004 Exercise Price $0.15 CN (Acquired 5/31/2002, Cost $10,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 6,304 1,000,000 Rimfire Minerals Corporation Expiration April 2004 Exercise Price $0.45 CN (Acquired 4/15/2002, Cost $10,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 6,304 625,000 Ross River Minerals Inc. Expiration November 2003 Exercise Price $0.35 CN (Acquired 5/21/2002, Cost $6,250)(4)<F27> r<F23> 3,940 2,000,000 SAMEX Mining Corp. Expiration March 2004 Exercise Price $0.20 CN (Acquired 3/05/2002, Cost $20,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 75,653 125,000 Silver Standard Resources Inc. Expiration October 2003 Exercise Price $3.00 CN (Acquired 10/29/2001, Cost $1,250)(4)<F27> r<F23> 273,452 75,000 Silver Standard Resources Inc. Expiration May 2004 Exercise Price $4.80 CN (Acquired 5/10/2002, Cost $750)(4)<F27> r<F23> 33,074 1,000,000 Silverado Gold Mines Ltd. Expiration May 2003 Exercise Price $0.20 (Acquired 5/06/2002, Cost $10,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 238,000 1,750,000 South American Gold and Copper Company Limited Expiration March 2004 Exercise Price $0.08 CN (Acquired 3/28/2002, Cost $17,500)(4)<F27> r<F23> 11,033 500,500 Starfield Resources Inc. Expiration October 2003 Exercise Price $0.55 CN (Acquired 10/10/2001, Cost $5,005)(4)<F27> r<F23> 3,155 500,000 Sultan Minerals Inc. Expiration January 2003 Exercise Price $0.32 CN (Acquired 1/18/2002, Cost $5,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 3,152 666,667 Sultan Minerals Inc. Expiration August 2003 Exercise Price $0.25 CN (Acquired 8/13/2001, Cost $6,667)(4)<F27> r<F23> 4,203 650,000 Tyhee Development Corp. Expiration May 2003 Exercise Price $0.30 CN (Acquired 5/01/2002, Cost $6,500)(4)<F27> r<F23> 23,358 62,500 Wheaton River Minerals Ltd. Expiration May 2007 Exercise Price $1.65 CN (Acquired 5/30/2002, Cost $625)(4)<F27> r<F23> 394 800,000 Xenolix Technologies, Inc. Expiration March 2003 Exercise Price $2.00 (Acquired 3/30/2001, Cost $800)(4)<F27> r<F23> 800 200,000 Xenolix Technologies, Inc. Expiration February 2004 Exercise Price $2.00 (Acquired 2/04/2002, Cost $2,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 200 ------------ TOTAL WARRANTS (Cost $1,042,827) 4,330,718 ------------ PRINCIPAL AMOUNT --------- CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURES -- 0.1%*<F21> $ 300,000 Golden Phoenix Minerals, Inc. (Acquired 1/14/2000, Cost $300,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 439,820 ------------ CORPORATE NOTES -- 0.3%*<F21> Globalstar LP/Capital 4,500,000 11.375%, 2/15/2004(8)<F31> 135,000 11,750,000 11.250%, 6/15/2004(8)<F31> 352,500 10,150,000 11.500%, 6/01/2005(8)<F31> 304,500 Itronics Inc. 250,000 12.000%, 5/14/2004 (Acquired 5/14/2001, Cost $250,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 250,000 380,000 12.000%, 10/24/2004 (Acquired 10/24/2001, Cost $380,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 380,000 100,000 12.000%, 3/15/2005 (Acquired 3/15/2002, Cost $100,000)(4)<F27> r<F23> 100,000 ------------ TOTAL CORPORATE NOTES: (Cost $3,408,660) 1,522,000 ------------ U.S. TREASURY OBLIGATIONS -- 54.3%*<F21> U.S. Treasury Notes: 26,314,000 4.625%, 2/28/2003(5)<F28> 26,663,476 12,200,000 4.250%, 3/31/2003(5)<F28> 12,373,948 12,300,000 4.250%, 5/31/2003(5)<F28> 12,527,747 13,600,000 3.875%, 6/30/2003(5)<F28> 13,845,970 4,800,000 3.875%, 7/31/2003(5)<F28> 4,896,562 4,200,000 3.625%, 8/31/2003(5)<F28> 4,282,522 7,560,000 3.625%, 3/31/2004(5)<F28> 7,786,505 33,700,000 3.375%, 4/30/2004(5)<F28> 34,624,121 21,900,000 3.250%, 5/31/2004(5)<F28> 22,476,583 32,000,000 2.875%, 6/30/2004(5)<F28> 32,668,736 35,700,000 2.250%, 7/31/2004(5)<F28> 36,073,743 1,400,000 6.000%, 8/15/2004(5)<F28> 1,511,782 72,000,000 2.125%, 8/31/2004(5)<F28> 72,596,232 4,900,000 1.875%, 9/30/2004 4,916,459 ------------ TOTAL U.S. TREASURY NOTES (Cost $283,745,373) 287,244,386 ------------ SHORT TERM INVESTMENTS -- 10.1%* SHARES ------ MUTUAL FUNDS -- 0.8%*<F21> 4,182,528 First American Treasury Obligations Fund 4,182,528 ------------ PRINCIPAL AMOUNT --------- U.S. TREASURY OBLIGATIONS -- 9.3%*<F21> U.S. Treasury Bills: $11,013,000 1.53%, 10/03/2002 11,012,064 18,513,000 1.58%, 10/10/2002 18,505,705 16,019,000 1.51%, 10/17/2002 16,008,272 3,500,000 1.54%, 12/26/2002 3,487,124 ------------ 49,013,165 ------------ TOTAL SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS (Cost $53,195,859) 53,195,693 ------------ TOTAL INVESTMENTS (Cost $456,516,971) (see note 1) $472,359,298 ------------ ------------ NOTES TO SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS CN - Canadian Dollars ADR - American Depository Receipt *<F21> Calculated as a percentage of net assets. **<F22> Non-income producing security. R<F23> Restricted security. (1)<F24> Shares are held to cover all or a portion of a corresponding short position. (2)<F25> Private placement issue (trades at a discount to market value). (3)<F26> Foreign security. (4)<F27> Fair valued security. (5)<F28> All or a portion of the securities have been committed as collateral for open short positions. (6)<F29> Holding entitles Fund to 525,738 voting rights for Maxam Gold Corporation Preferred and 52,574 voting rights for MCM Custom Milling Corporation. (7)<F30> Affiliated company. See Note 8 in Notes to the Financial Statements. (8)<F31> Security in default. See notes to the financial statements. PRUDENT BEAR FUND SCHEDULE OF SECURITIES SOLD SHORT SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 SHARES VALUE ------ ----- 147,000 ADTRAN, Inc. $ 2,293,200 120,000 Advanced Fibre Communications, Inc. 1,592,400 130,000 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 694,200 165,000 Advanced Energy Industries, Inc. 1,468,500 10,000 The AES Corporation 25,100 10,000 Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. - Class A 425,500 21,000 Affymetrix, Inc. 436,800 40,000 Alcatel SA - ADR 93,200 5,000 Altera Corporation 43,350 48,000 Amazon.com, Inc. 764,640 54,000 Ambac Financial Group, Inc. 2,910,060 15,000 American Capital Strategies, Ltd. 282,600 54,000 American Express Company 1,683,720 21,000 American International Group, Inc. 1,148,700 36,000 AmeriCredit Corp. 290,520 90,000 Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1,495,800 20,000 Analog Devices, Inc. 394,000 260,000 Andrew Corporation 1,703,000 25,000 Applied Materials, Inc. 288,750 60,000 AutoNation, Inc. 691,200 41,002 Avigen, Inc. 325,146 115,000 BEA Systems, Inc. 595,700 16,000 Beazer Homes USA, Inc. 976,800 50,000 Belden Inc. 671,000 12,000 Black Box Corporation 398,400 20,000 Boyd Gaming Corporation 373,400 61,000 Broadcom Corporation - Class A 651,480 145,000 Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. 1,091,850 79,000 Brunswick Corporation 1,662,160 40,000 Cablevision Systems New York Group - Class A 362,400 23,000 Cabot Microelectronics Corporation 856,520 70,000 Capital One Financial Corporation 2,444,400 37,000 CDW Computer Centers, Inc. 1,567,320 10,000 CEC Entertainment Inc. 341,100 45,000 CenturyTel, Inc. 1,009,350 31,000 Cerus Corporation 516,770 70,000 Cisco Systems, Inc. 733,600 50,000 Citigroup Inc. 1,482,500 200,000 Clayton Homes, Inc. 2,196,000 35,000 Clear Channel Communications, Inc. 1,216,250 15,000 Computer Sciences Corporation 416,850 82,000 Convergys Corporation 1,232,460 35,000 Cox Communications, Inc. - Class A 860,650 15,000 Credence Systems Corporation 129,900 3,000 Credit Acceptance Corporation 24,600 60,000 Cree, Inc. 750,000 50,000 CSG Systems International, Inc. 545,000 57,000 CV Therapeutics, Inc. 1,191,870 92,000 Cymer, Inc. 1,714,880 190,000 DIAMONDS Trust, Series I 14,440,000 60,000 Dillard's, Inc. - Class A 1,210,800 50,000 D.R. Horton, Inc. 931,000 58,000 Eastman Kodak Company 1,579,920 7,000 eBay Inc. 369,670 40,000 Eli Lilly and Company 2,213,600 115,000 El Paso Corporation 951,050 7,500 Enesco Group, Inc. 52,575 9,000 Equity Office Properties Trust 232,380 85,000 ESS Technology, Inc. 522,750 40,000 Ethan Allen Interiors Inc. 1,294,400 32,000 Exar Corporation 369,600 180 Extreme Networks, Inc. 758 35,000 Fannie Mae 2,083,900 30,000 Federated Department Stores, Inc. 883,200 10,000 Fifth Third Bancorp 612,300 12,000 Financial Select Sector SPDR Fund 248,040 10,000 FleetBoston Financial Corporation 203,300 110,000 Foundry Networks, Inc. 602,800 8,000 Freddie Mac 447,200 100,000 GATX Corporation 1,980,000 25,000 General Electric Company 616,250 50,000 General Motors Corporation 1,945,000 52,000 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 3,433,560 72,500 The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company 644,525 38,000 GreenPoint Financial Corp. 1,586,120 35,000 Harley-Davidson, Inc. 1,625,750 66,000 Household International, Inc. 1,868,460 15,000 Integrated Circuit Systems, Inc. 235,500 41,700 InterMune Inc. 1,368,594 55,000 Internet Security Systems, Inc. 677,600 148,000 Intersil Corporation - Class A 1,918,080 70,000 Iron Mountain Incorporated 1,749,300 131,100 Irwin Financial Corporation 2,228,700 177,000 Isis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1,745,220 80,000 J.C. Penney Company, Inc. 1,273,600 121,000 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 2,297,790 100,000 Juniper Networks, Inc. 480,000 20,000 KB HOME 976,800 5,700 KCS Energy, Inc. 8,550 20,000 Kinder Morgan, Inc. 709,000 37,000 KLA-Tencor Corporation 1,033,780 38,000 Kohl's Corporation 2,310,780 50,000 Lamar Advertising Company 1,517,500 65,000 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 3,188,250 5,000 Lennar Corporation 278,900 24,000 LightPath Technologies, Inc. - Class A 9,360 27,000 Linear Technology Corporation 559,440 13,000 Lowe's Companies, Inc. 538,200 10,000 Mandalay Resort Group 335,500 83,000 Manhattan Associates, Inc. 1,122,160 1,000 Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. 24,760 93,000 MBIA Inc. 3,715,350 187,000 MBNA Corporation 3,437,060 50,000 McKesson Corporation 1,416,500 22,000 Mediacom Communications Corporation 118,140 504 The Medicines Company 5,533 45,000 MedImmune, Inc. 941,400 20,000 Meridian Gold Inc. 366,000 74,000 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 2,438,300 59,000 Metris Companies Inc. 136,290 55,000 MGIC Investment Corporation 2,245,650 15,000 MGM MIRAGE 559,500 102,500 Micrel, Incorporated 631,400 40,000 Microchip Technology Incorporated 818,000 38,000 Moody's Corporation 1,843,000 123,000 Morgan Stanley 4,167,240 10,000 National City Corporation 285,300 30,000 Network Appliance, Inc. 219,900 10,000 Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc. 410,000 30,000 Newell Rubbermaid Inc. 926,100 40,000 Newport Corporation 451,200 18,000 NIKE, Inc. - Class B 777,240 95,000 Nokia Oyj - ADR 1,258,750 55,000 NorthWestern Corporation 536,800 63,000 OmniVision Technologies, Inc. 415,170 130,000 ON Semiconductor Corporation 162,500 60,000 Overture Services, Inc. 1,414,200 5,636 Photon Dynamics, Inc. 104,998 140,000 Pixelworks, Inc. 721,000 30,000 The PMI Group, Inc. 816,300 22,000 Polaris Industries Inc. 1,364,000 24,000 QLogic Corporation 624,960 29,000 QUALCOMM Inc 800,980 40,000 Quantum Fuel Systems Technologies Worldwide, Inc. 85,600 72,000 Radian Group Inc. 2,351,520 14,700 Regions Financial Corporation 480,249 7,000 Rent-A-Center, Inc. 363,650 25,000 Research In Motion Limited 235,500 124,000 RF Micro Devices, Inc. 744,000 44,000 Ruby Tuesday, Inc. 826,320 25,000 The Ryland Group, Inc. 929,250 30,000 SanDisk Corporation 393,300 30,000 ScanSoft, Inc. 99,000 142,000 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 1,776,420 25,000 Sealed Air Corporation 422,250 42,000 Sears, Roebuck and Co. 1,638,000 105,000 Semtech Corporation 1,018,500 195,000 The Shaw Group Inc. 2,769,000 55,000 Silicon Image, Inc. 224,950 155,300 Silicon Valley Bancshares 2,629,229 45,000 Sola International Inc. 452,250 65,000 SPDR Trust Series 1 5,316,350 100,000 Specialty Laboratories, Inc. 919,000 190,000 Sprint Corporation 1,732,800 18,000 Stage Stores, Inc. 390,420 45,000 Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. 1,003,500 1,000 Symantec Corporation 33,630 10,000 TCF Financial Corporation 423,300 130,000 TECO Energy, Inc. 2,064,400 12,300 Terex Corporation 207,870 25,000 Time Warner Telecom Inc. - Class A 20,250 40,000 Toll Brothers, Inc. 869,600 15,000 The Toronto-Dominion Bank 264,150 30,000 Trammell Crow Company 295,800 1,771 Travelers Property Casualty Corp. - Class A 23,382 3,639 Travelers Property Casualty Corp. - Class B 49,241 47,000 Trimeris, Inc. 2,098,550 85,000 Tyco International Ltd. 1,198,500 90,000 United Online, Inc. 863,100 52,000 United States Cellular Corporation 1,538,160 20,000 Univision Communications Inc. - Class A 456,000 102,000 UTStarcom, Inc. 1,557,540 16,000 Varian Semiconductor Equipment Associates, Inc. 263,040 3,000 VeriSign, Inc. 15,150 15,000 VERITAS Software Corporation 220,050 35,000 Verizon Communications Inc. 960,400 25,000 Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. 220,000 40,000 Washington Mutual, Inc. 1,258,800 45,000 Wells Fargo & Company 2,167,200 18,000 Whirlpool Corporation 825,480 65,000 Winstar Communications, Inc. 98 76,000 Xilinx, Inc. 1,203,688 89,500 Zoran Corporation 984,500 ------------ TOTAL SECURITIES SOLD SHORT (Proceeds $229,695,124) $195,611,566 ------------ ------------ See notes to the financial statements. PRUDENT SAFE HARBOR FUND SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 SHARES VALUE ------ ----- COMMON STOCKS -- 12.4% CANADA -- 4.8% 90,000 Barrick Gold Corporation $ 1,399,500 98,000 Central Fund of Canada Limited - Class A 430,220 542,800 Chesapeake Gold Corp.(2)<F33> 667,293 100,000 Goldcorp Inc. 1,103,000 274,000 Placer Dome Inc. 2,501,620 ------------ 6,101,633 ------------ CHANNEL ISLANDS -- 0.3% 17,500 Randgold Resources Limited - ADR(2)<F33> 316,558 ------------ SOUTH AFRICA -- 5.8% 65,000 AngloGold Limited - ADR 1,732,250 55,500 ASA Ltd. 1,790,985 224,000 Durban Roodepoort Deep Limited - ADR(2)<F33> 931,840 84,000 Gold Fields Limited - ADR 1,075,200 114,000 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited - ADR 1,784,100 ------------ 7,314,375 ------------ UNITED STATES -- 1.5% 68,000 Newmont Mining Corporation 1,870,680 ------------ TOTAL COMMON STOCK (Cost $14,248,472) 15,603,246 ------------ OUNCES ------ COMMODITIES -- 1.4% 5,663 Gold Bullion(1)<F32> (2)<F33> 1,813,897 ------------ TOTAL COMMODITIES (Cost $1,671,273) 1,813,897 ------------ PRINCIPAL AMOUNT --------- U.S. TREASURY OBLIGATIONS -- 23.9% U.S. Treasury Notes: $ 1,500,000 3.88%, 7/31/2003 1,530,176 5,000,000 3.25%, 5/31/2004 5,131,640 4,000,000 2.25%, 7/31/2004 4,041,876 19,277,000 2.13%, 8/31/2004 19,436,633 ------------ 30,140,325 ------------ TOTAL U.S. TREASURIES (Cost $29,890,230) 30,140,325 ------------ FOREIGN TREASURY OBLIGATIONS -- 57.9% CANADA -- 3.4% Canadian Government Bonds: 2,290,000 5.00%, 12/01/2003 1,478,380 4,180,000 6.50%, 6/01/2004 2,783,065 ------------ 4,261,445 ------------ DENMARK -- 4.7% Kingdom of Denmark Bonds: 4,600,000 6.00%, 11/15/2002 613,997 7,250,000 5.00%, 11/15/2003 983,134 31,900,000 4.00%, 11/15/2004 4,289,072 ------------ 5,886,203 ------------ FINLAND -- 1.7% Finnish Government Bond: 1,970,000 9.50%, 3/15/2004 2,115,920 ------------ FRANCE -- 12.6% French Treasury Notes: 290,000 5.00%, 1/12/2003 287,905 1,825,000 4.50%, 7/12/2003 1,821,831 2,110,000 4.00%, 1/12/2004 2,110,548 10,465,000 3.50%, 7/12/2004 10,421,063 1,200,000 6.75%, 10/25/2004 1,282,546 ------------ 15,923,893 ------------ GERMANY -- 6.1% Bundesschatzanweisungen: 3,830,000 4.25%, 3/12/2004 3,849,195 Bundesrepub.Deutschland: 3,600,000 7.50%, 11/11/2004 3,866,499 ------------ 7,715,694 ------------ NORWAY -- 2.1% Norwegian Government Bonds: 5,250,000 9.50%, 10/31/2002 709,417 14,540,000 5.75%, 11/30/2004 1,944,932 ------------ 2,654,349 ------------ SWEDEN -- 1.8% Swedish Government Bonds: 15,950,000 10.25%, 5/05/2003 1,777,858 5,000,000 5.00%, 1/15/2004 544,203 ------------ 2,322,061 ------------ SWITZERLAND -- 25.5% Swiss Government Bonds: 1,005,000 6.25%, 1/07/2003 692,148 9,485,000 6.50%, 4/10/2004 6,992,065 26,230,000 4.50%, 10/07/2004 18,969,211 7,400,000 5.50%, 1/06/2005 5,498,262 ------------ 32,151,686 ------------ TOTAL FOREIGN TREASURY OBLIGATIONS (Cost $69,330,710) 73,031,251 ------------ SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS -- 3.7% U.S. TREASURIES -- 3.1% U.S. Treasury Bill: $ 4,000,000 1.51%, 1/30/2003 3,979,700 ------------ SHARES ------ MUTUAL FUNDS -- 0.6% 780,249 First American Treasury Obligations Fund 780,249 ------------ TOTAL SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS (Cost $4,760,455) 4,759,949 ------------ TOTAL INVESTMENTS (Cost $119,901,140) -- 99.3% 125,348,668 ------------ Other Assets less Liabilities -- 0.7% 842,551 ------------ Total Net Assets -- 100.0% $126,191,219 ------------ ------------ ADR - American Depository Receipt (1)<F32> Fair valued investment. (2)<F33> Non-income producing security. See notes to the financial statements. NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 1. ORGANIZATION AND SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES Prudent Bear Funds, Inc. (the "Company") was incorporated on October 25, 1995, as a Maryland Corporation and is registered as a diversified open-end management investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act"). The Company currently consists of three series: thePrudent Bear Fund, the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund and the Prudent Bear Large Cap Fund (each a "Fund" and collectively the "Funds"). As of September 30, 2002, the Prudent Bear Large Cap Fund had not commenced operations. The investment objectives of the Funds are set forth below. The investment objective of the Prudent Bear Fund is capital appreciation, which it seeks to obtain primarily through short sales of equity securities when overall market valuations are high, and through long positions in value-oriented equity securities when overall market valuations are low. The Prudent Bear Fund commenced operations on December 28, 1995. The Prudent Bear Fund has issued two classes of shares: No Load and Class C shares. The No Load shares are subject to a 0.25% 12b-1 fee, while the Class C shares are subject to a 1.00% 12b-1 fee, as described in accordance with the Fund's prospectuses. Each class of shares has identical rights and privileges except with respect to 12b-1 fees and voting rights on matters affecting a single class of shares. The investment objective of the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund is current income and capital appreciation through investments primarily in liquid securities issued by major industrialized nations, and equity securities of companies that mine gold and gold bullion. The Prudent Safe Harbor Fund commenced operations on February 2, 2000. The investment objective of the Prudent Bear Large Cap Fund is capital appreciation in declining equity markets, which it seeks to obtain primarily through short sales of equity securities as well as selling futures contracts and purchasing put options on stock indices. The Prudent Bear Large Cap Fund had not commenced operations as of September 30, 2002. The following is a summary of significant accounting policies consistently followed by the Funds. a) Investment Valuation - Common stocks, preferred stocks and securities sold short that are listed on a securities exchange or quoted on the NASDAQ Stock Market are valued at the last quoted sales price on the day the valuation is made. Price information on listed stocks is taken from the exchange where the security is primarily traded. Common stocks and securities sold short which are listed on an exchange or the NASDAQ Stock Market but which are not traded on the valuation date are valued at the average of the current bid and asked price. Unlisted equity securities for which market quotations are readily available are valued at the latest quoted bid price. Debt securities are valued at the latest bid price. Mutual fund investments are valued at the net asset value on the day the valuation is made. Other assets and securities for which no quotations are readily available are valued at fair value as determined in good faith by management in accordance with procedures approved by the Board of Directors. At September 30, 2002, such investments represent 4.3% and 1.4% of net assets, at value, in the Prudent Bear Fund and the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund, respectively. Short-term debt instruments (those with remaining maturities of 60 days or less) are valued at amortized cost, which approximates market value. b) Short Positions - The Funds may engage in short sale transactions. For financial statement purposes, an amount equal to the settlement amount is included in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as an asset and an equivalent liability. The amount of the liability is subsequently marked-to-market to reflect the current value of the short position. Subsequent fluctuations in the market prices of securities sold, but not yet purchased, may require purchasing the securities at prices which may differ from the market value reflected on the Statement of Assets and Liabilities. The Funds are liable for any dividends paid on securities sold short. The Prudent Bear Fund's receivables from brokers for proceeds on securities sold short are with two major security dealers. The Funds do not require the brokers to maintain collateral in support of these receivables. c) Written Option Accounting - The Funds write (sell) put and call options. When the Funds write (sell) an option, an amount equal to the premium received by the Funds is included in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as an asset and an equivalent liability. The amount of the liability is subsequently marked-to-market to reflect the current value of the option written. By writing an option, the Funds may become obligated during the term of the option to deliver (with respect to a call option) or purchase (with respect to a put option) the securities underlying the option at the exercise price if the option is exercised. Option contracts are valued at the average of the current bid and asked price reported on the day of valuation. When an option expires on its stipulated expiration date the Funds realize a gain. When the Funds enter into a closing purchase transaction, the Funds realize a gain or loss if the cost of the closing purchase transaction differs from the premium received when the option was sold without regard to any unrealized gain or loss on the underlying security, and the liability related to such option is eliminated. If a call option written by a Fund is exercised, the proceeds of the sale of the underlying security will be increased by the premium originally received and the Fund will realize a gain or loss on the sale of the security. If a put option written by a Fund is exercised, the Fund's basis in the underlying security will be reduced by the premium originally received. d) Collateral on Short Sales, Written Options and Futures Contracts - As collateral for short positions, written options and futures contracts, the Funds are required under the 1940 Act to maintain assets consisting of cash or liquid securities. For short positions, this collateral must equal the market value of the securities sold short. For written options, this collateral must equal the market value of the purchase obligation for put options or the market value of the instrument underlying the contract for call options. For futures contracts, this collateral must equal the market value of the purchase obligation for long futures contracts or the market value of the instrument underlying the contract for short futures contracts. All collateral is required to be adjusted daily. e) Federal Income Taxes - No provision for federal income taxes has been made since the Funds intend to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code applicable to regulated investment companies and to distribute investment company net taxable income and net capital gains to shareholders. Additionally, the Funds intend to make all required distributions to avoid being liable for federal excise taxes. f) Purchased Option Accounting - Premiums paid for option contracts purchased are included in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as an asset. Option contracts are valued at the average of the current bid and asked price reported on the day of valuation. When option contracts expire or are closed, realized gains or losses are recognized without regard to any unrealized gains or losses on the underlying securities. Put option contracts are held by the Funds for trading purposes and call option contracts are held by the Funds for trading and hedging purposes. g) Distributions to Shareholders - Dividends from net investment income are declared and paid annually for the Prudent Bear Fund and quarterly for the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund. Distributions of net realized capital gains, if any, will be declared and paid at least annually for both Funds. h) Use of Estimates - The preparation of financial statements in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America require management to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts of assets and liabilities and disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at the date of the financial statements and the reported amounts of revenues and expenses during the reporting period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. i) Other - Investment and shareholder transactions are recorded on trade date. The Funds determine the gain or loss realized from investment transactions by comparing the original cost of the security lot sold with the net sales proceeds. Dividend income is recognized on the ex- dividend date or as soon as information is available to the Fund, and interest income is recognized on an accrual basis. Investment income for the Prudent Bear Fund includes $1,739,053 of interest earned on receivables from brokers for proceeds on securities sold short. There was no interest earned on receivables from brokers for proceeds on securities sold short for the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund. Accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America require that permanent financial reporting and tax differences be reclassified in the capital accounts. j) Futures Contracts and Options on Futures Contracts - The Prudent Bear Fund may purchase and sell stock index futures contracts and options on such futures contracts, while the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund may purchase and sell debt futures contracts and options on such futures contracts. Upon entering into a contract, the Funds deposit and maintain as collateral such initial margin as required by the exchange on which the transaction is effected. Pursuant to the contract, the Funds agree to receive from or pay to the futures commission merchant an amount of cash equal to the daily fluctuation in the value of the contract. Such receipts or payments are known as variation margin and are recorded by the Funds as unrealized gains and losses. When the contract is closed, the Funds record a realized gain or loss equal to the difference between the value of the contract at the time it was opened and the value at the time it was closed. k) Risks of Options, Futures Contracts and Options onFutures Contracts - The risks inherent in the use of options, futures contracts, and options on futures contracts include: 1) adverse changes in the value of such instruments; 2) imperfect correlation between the price of options and futures contracts and options thereon and movements in the price of the underlying securities, index or futures contracts; 3) the possible absence of a liquid secondary market for any particular instrument at any time; 4) the possible need to defer closing out certain positions to avoid adverse tax consequences; and 5) the possible nonperformance by the counterparty under the terms of the contract. l) Restricted Securities - The Prudent Bear Fund owns investment securities which are unregistered and thus restricted as to resale. These securities are valued by the Fund after giving due consideration to pertinent factors including recent private sales, market conditions and the issuer's financial performance. Where future disposition of these securities requires registration under the Securities Act of 1933, the Fund has the right to include these securities in such registration, generally without cost to the Fund. The Fund has no right to require registration of unregistered securities. At September 30, 2002, the Fund had restricted securities with an aggregate market value of $22,041,694 representing 4.2% of the net assets of the Fund. m) Foreign Securities - Investing in securities of foreign companies and foreign governments involves special risks and consideration not typically associated with investing in U.S. companies and the U.S. government. These risks include revaluation of currencies and future adverse political and economic developments. Moreover, securities of many foreign companies and foreign governments and their markets may be less liquid and their prices more volatile than those of securities of comparable U.S. companies and the U.S. government. n) Foreign Currency Translations - The books and records of the Funds are maintained in U.S. dollars. Foreign currency transactions are translated into U.S. dollars on the following basis: (i) market value of investment securities, assets and liabilities at the daily rates of exchange, and (ii) purchases and sales of investment securities, dividend and interest income and certain expenses at the rates of exchange prevailing on the respective dates of such transactions. For financial reporting purposes, the Funds do not isolate changes in the exchange rate of investment securities from the fluctuations arising from changes in the market price of such securities. However, for federal income tax purposes the Funds do isolate and treat as ordinary income the effect of changes in foreign exchange rates on realized gain or loss from the sale of debt securities and payables and receivables arising from trade date and settlement date differences. 2. CAPITAL SHARE TRANSACTIONS Transactions in shares of the Funds were as follows: Prudent Bear Fund Year Ended No Load Shares: September 30, 2002 --------------------------- $ Shares ------------ ----------- Shares sold $868,787,535 129,021,398 Shares issued to holders in reinvestment of dividends 4,078,790 853,303 Shares redeemed (632,946,808) (96,269,651) ------------ ----------- Net increase $239,919,517 33,605,050 ------------ ------------ Shares Outstanding: Beginning of period 29,105,548 ----------- End of period 62,710,598 ----------- ----------- Year Ended Class C Shares: September 30, 2002 --------------------------- $ Shares ------------ ----------- Shares sold $ 8,457,907 1,333,601 Shares issued to holders in reinvestment of dividends 63,278 13,435 Shares redeemed (3,640,215) (610,467) ------------ ----------- Net increase $ 4,880,970 736,569 ------------ ------------ Shares Outstanding: Beginning of period 226,352 ----------- End of period 962,921 ----------- ----------- Year Ended No Load Shares: September 30, 2001 --------------------------- $ Shares ------------ ----------- Shares sold $335,284,627 70,493,807 Shares issued to holders in reinvestment of dividends 6,926,690 1,512,378 Shares redeemed (388,901,322) (81,923,404) ------------ ----------- Net decrease $(46,690,005) (9,917,219) ------------ ------------ Shares Outstanding: Beginning of period 39,022,767 ----------- End of period 29,105,548 ----------- ----------- Year Ended Class C Shares: September 30, 2001 --------------------------- $ Shares ------------ ----------- Shares sold $ 2,311,108 484,427 Shares issued to holders in reinvestment of dividends 10,909 2,398 Shares redeemed (2,276,554) (484,190) ------------ ----------- Net increase $ 45,463 2,635 ------------ ------------ Shares Outstanding: Beginning of period 223,717 ----------- End of period 226,352 ----------- ----------- Prudent Safe Harbor Fund Year Ended September 30, 2002 --------------------------- $ Shares ------------ ----------- Shares sold $226,790,135 20,888,291 Shares issued to holders in reinvestment of dividends 1,673,306 156,127 Shares redeemed (134,136,115) (12,341,915) ------------ ----------- Net increase $ 94,327,326 8,702,503 ------------ ------------ Shares Outstanding: Beginning of period 2,612,561 ----------- End of period 11,315,064 ----------- Year Ended September 30, 2001 --------------------------- $ Shares ------------ ----------- Shares sold $ 43,865,227 4,816,706 Shares issued to holders in reinvestment of dividends 171,437 18,848 Shares redeemed (21,663,753) (2,377,681) ------------ ----------- Net increase $ 22,372,911 2,457,873 ------------ ------------ Shares Outstanding: Beginning of period 154,688 ----------- End of period 2,612,561 ----------- ----------- 3. INVESTMENT TRANSACTIONS The aggregate purchases and sales of investments, excluding short-term investments, options and short positions, by the Funds for the periods ended September 30, 2002, were as follows: Prudent Bear Fund Prudent Safe Harbor Fund ----------------- ------------------------ Purchases $455,910,277 $132,800,337 Sales $228,942,774 $ 41,023,955 Included in these amounts were purchases and sales of long-term U.S. government securities, for the periods ended September 30, 2002, as follows: Prudent Bear Fund Prudent Safe Harbor Fund ----------------- ------------------------ Purchases $372,285,232 $52,315,887 Sales $177,141,279 $24,808,805 At September 30, 2002, gross unrealized appreciation and depreciation of investments for tax purposes were as follows: Prudent Bear Fund Appreciation $ 34,124,656 (Depreciation) (28,972,473) ------------ Net appreciation on investments $ 5,152,183 ------------ ------------ Prudent Safe Harbor Fund Appreciation $ 6,171,292 (Depreciation) (1,112,119) ------------ Net appreciation on investments $ 5,059,173 ------------ ------------ At September 30, 2002, the cost of investments for federal income tax purposes for the Prudent Bear Fund and the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund were $467,207,115 and $120,289,495, respectively. The tax character of distributions paid during 2002 and 2001 was as follows: Prudent Bear Fund 2002 2001 ---- ---- Ordinary income $4,788,817 $7,742,215 Long-term capital gain 0 0 ---------- ---------- $4,788,817 $7,742,215 ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- Prudent Safe Harbor Fund 2002 2001 ---- ---- Ordinary income $1,861,639 $190,263 Long-term capital gain 0 0 ---------- -------- $1,861,639 $190,263 ---------- -------- ---------- -------- As of September 30, 2002, the components of distributable earnings on a tax basis were as follows: Prudent Bear Fund Prudent Safe Harbor Fund ----------------- ------------------------ Undistributed ordinary income $14,391,140 $1,300,642 Undistributed long-term gain $12,688,038 $1,564,513 The Prudent Bear Fund realized, on a tax basis, post October losses through September 30, 2002 of $2,251 which are not recognized for tax purposes until the first day of the following fiscal year. 4. INVESTMENT ADVISORY AND OTHER AGREEMENTS The Funds have entered into Investment Advisory Agreements with David W. Tice & Associates, Inc. Pursuant to its advisory agreements with the Funds, the Investment Adviser is entitled to receive a fee, calculated daily and payable monthly, at the annual rate of 1.25% and 0.75% for the Prudent Bear Fund and the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund, respectively, as applied to the Funds' daily net assets. Certain officers of the Adviser are also officers of the Funds. For the period ended September 30, 2002, the Adviser agreed to waive its investment advisory fee and/or reimburse the Fund's operating expenses (exclusive of brokerage, interest, taxes, short dividends and extraordinary expenses) to the extent necessary to ensure that the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund's total operating expenses did not exceed 1.50% of the average net assets. During the period ended September 30, 2002, the Adviser reimbursed the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund $30,867. U.S. BancorpFund Services, LLC ("U.S. Bancorp") serves as transfer agent, administrator and accounting services agent for the Funds. U.S. Bank, N.A. serves as custodian for the Funds. 5. EXPENSE REDUCTIONS The Adviser had directed certain of the Funds' portfolio trades to brokers at best price and execution and has generated directed brokerage credits to reduce certain U.S. Bancorp service provider fees. Shareholders benefit under this arrangement as the net expenses of the Funds do not include such service provider fees. For the period ended September 30, 2002, the Prudent Bear Fund and the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund's expenses were reduced by $114,013 and $1,572, respectively, by utilizing directed brokerage credits resulting in an expense ratio of 1.84%, 2.59%, and 1.50% being charged to Prudent Bear Fund No Load shareholders, Class C shareholders, and Prudent Safe Harbor Fund shareholders, respectively. In accordance with Securities and Exchange Commission requirements, such amount, when incurred, is required to be shown as an expense and will be included in each of the U.S. Bancorp fees in the Statement of Operations. 6. FUTURES CONTRACTS At September 30, 2002, the Prudent Bear Fund had entered into stock index futures contracts. The net unrealized appreciation of $3,458,500 is included in the net unrealized appreciation section of the accompanying financial statements. The terms of the open contracts are as follows: Number of Underlying MarketValue of Unrealized Contracts Instrument Underlying Instrument Appreciation --------- ---------- --------------------- ------------ (285) S&P 500 Index Futures December 2002 $(58,068,750) $3,458,500 7. OPTION CONTRACTS WRITTEN The premium amount and the number of option contracts written for the Prudent Bear Fund during the period ended September 30, 2002, were as follows: Premium Amount Number of Contracts -------------- ------------------- Options outstanding at September 30, 2001 $ -- -- Options written 870,544 1,400 Options closed (854,164) (1,200) Options exercised -- -- Options expired (16,380) (200) --------- ------ Options outstanding at September 30, 2002 $ -- -- --------- ------ --------- ------ 8. TRANSACTIONS WITH AFFILIATES The following companies are affiliated with the Prudent Bear Fund; that is, the Fund held 5% or more of the outstanding voting securities during the period from October 1, 2001 through September 30, 2002. Such companies are defined in Section (2)(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940: [Enlarge/Download Table] REALIZED SHARE BALANCE SHARE BALANCE GAINS SECURITY NAME AT OCTOBER 1, 2001 PURCHASES SALES AT SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 DIVIDENDS (LOSSES) ------------- ------------------ --------- ----- --------------------- --------- ------- Alamos Minerals Ltd. -- 2,533,334 -- 2,533,334 -- -- Altius Minerals Corporation -- 800,000 -- 800,000 -- -- Aura Systems, Inc. 4,814,200 17,790,000 -- 22,604,200 -- -- Banro Corporation -- 883,600 -- 883,600 -- -- Canarc Resource Corp. 4,375,500 986,500 -- 5,362,000 -- -- Candente Resource Corp. 765,700 1,840,000 -- 2,605,700 -- -- Canyon Resources Corporation 658,677 402,299 -- 1,060,976 -- -- Cardima, Inc. 2,187,931 2,826,333 -- 5,014,264 -- -- Chesapeake Gold Corp. -- 1,502,200(1)<F34> -- 1,502,200 -- -- Dynatec Corporation 8,678,800 -- 300,000 8,378,800 -- $ (12,729) ECU Silver Mining Inc. 6,415,060 6,415,060 6,415,060 6,415,060 -- (1,008,027) Excellon Resources, Inc. -- 2,000,000 -- 2,000,000 -- -- IMA Exploration Inc. -- 2,391,137 -- 2,391,137 -- -- IRIDEX Corporation -- 389,741 -- 389,741 -- -- KleenAir Systems, Inc. -- 2,686,500 -- 2,686,500 -- -- Madison Enterprises Corp. -- 3,500,000 -- 3,500,000 -- -- Metaline Mining Co. Inc. 700,000 -- -- 700,000 -- -- Minefinders Corporation Ltd. 1,009,364 371,028 1,230,392 150,000 -- 3,385,108 Nevada Pacific Gold Ltd. -- 2,001,000 -- 2,001,000 -- -- Orezone Resources Inc. -- 5,669,450 -- 5,669,450 -- -- Pelangio Mines Inc. -- 5,042,500 -- 5,042,500 -- -- Platinum Group Metals Ltd. -- 1,514,500 -- 1,514,500 -- -- Redstar Gold Corp. -- 1,000,000 -- 1,000,000 -- -- Rimfire Minerals Corporation -- 1,220,000 -- 1,220,000 -- -- Ross River Minerals Inc. -- 625,000 -- 625,000 -- -- Starfield Resources Inc. 762,025 1,907,263 -- 2,669,288 -- -- Sultan Minerals Inc. 1,333,333 1,000,000 -- 2,333,333 -- -- Tyhee Development Corp. -- 650,000 -- 650,000 -- -- Western Copper Holdings Limited -- 2,432,800 -- 2,432,800 -- -- ---- ---------- -- $2,364,352 ---- ---------- ---- ---------- (1)<F34> 236,800 shares received from holdings of Francisco Gold Corporation on 7/17/2002. 9. SERVICE AND DISTRIBUTION PLAN The Funds have adopted Service and Distribution Plans (the "Plans") pursuant to Rule 12b-1 under the 1940 Act. The Plans authorize payments by the Funds in connection with the distribution of their shares at an annual rate, as determined from time to time by the Board of Directors, of up to 0.25% of the Funds' average daily net assets for the Prudent Bear No Load shares and Prudent Safe Harbor Fund and up to 1.00% for the Prudent Bear Class C shares. The currently approved rate for the Prudent Bear No Load shares and the Prudent Safe Harbor Fund is 0.25% of average daily net assets. The currently approved rate for the Prudent Bear Class C shares is 1.00% of average daily net assets. Payments made pursuant to the Plans may only be used to pay distribution expenses in the year incurred. Amounts paid under the Plans by the Funds may be spent by the Funds on any activities or expenses primarily intended to result in the sale of shares of the Funds, including but not limited to, advertising, compensation for sales and marketing activities of financial institutions and others such as dealers and distributors, shareholder account servicing, the printing and mailing of prospectuses to other than current shareholders and the printing and mailing of sales literature. The Prudent Bear Fund incurred $615,832 for the No Load Shares and $33,416 for the Class C Shares pursuant to the Plans for the period ended September 30, 2002. The Prudent Safe Harbor Fund incurred $140,892 pursuant to the Plan for the period ended September 30, 2002. 10. RESULTS OF PROXY (UNAUDITED) Following are the results from the shareholder vote taken on September 23, 2002 to elect directors to serve on the Board of Directors for the Prudent Bear Funds, Inc.: [Enlarge/Download Table] Prudent Bear Fund - No Load Shares SHARES % OF TOTAL SHARES % OF VOTED SHARES NOMINEE SHARES FOR AGAINST FOR AGAINST FOR AGAINST ------- ---------- ------- --- ------- --- ------- David W. Tice 25,734,852.731 342,118.296 63.118% 0.839% 98.688% 1.312% Gregg Jahnke 25,667,083.725 409,887.302 62.951% 1.006% 98.428% 1.572% David Eric Luck 25,796,822.025 280,149.002 63.269% 0.688% 98.926% 1.074% Kim Evans 25,808,348.803 268,622.224 63.298% 0.659% 98.970% 1.030% Edmund M. McCarthy 25,807,431.395 269,539.632 63.296% 0.661% 98.966% 1.034% [Enlarge/Download Table] Prudent Bear Fund - Class C Shares SHARES % OF TOTAL SHARES % OF VOTED SHARES NOMINEE SHARES FOR AGAINST FOR AGAINST FOR AGAINST ------- ---------- ------- --- ------- --- ------- David W. Tice 703,956.402 1,925.926 85.822% 0.234% 99.727% 0.273% Gregg Jahnke 703,956.402 1,925.926 85.822% 0.234% 99.727% 0.273% David Eric Luck 703,956.402 1,925.926 85.822% 0.234% 99.727% 0.273% Kim Evans 703,956.402 1,925.926 85.822% 0.234% 99.727% 0.273% Edmund M. McCarthy 703,956.402 1,925.926 85.822% 0.234% 99.727% 0.273% [Enlarge/Download Table] Prudent Safe Harbor Fund SHARES % OF TOTAL SHARES % OF VOTED SHARES NOMINEE SHARES FOR AGAINST FOR AGAINST FOR AGAINST ------- ---------- ------- --- ------- --- ------- David W. Tice 6,362,919.030 38,359.495 71.127% 0.428% 99.401% 0.599% Gregg Jahnke 6,287,428.389 113,850.136 70.283% 1.272% 98.221% 1.779% David Eric Luck 6,363,647.122 37,631.403 71.135% 0.420% 99.412% 0.588% Kim Evans 6,363,915.304 37,363.221 71.138% 0.417% 99.416% 0.584% Edmund M. McCarthy 6,364,141.122 37,137.403 71.140% 0.415% 99.420% 0.580% REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS To the Board of Directors and Shareholders of Prudent Bear Funds, Inc. In our opinion, the accompanying statements of assets and liabilities, including the schedules of investments and securities sold short, and the related statements of operations and of changes in net assets and the financial highlights present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Prudent Bear Funds, Inc. (the "Funds") at September 30, 2002, the results of their operations, the changes in their net assets and their financial highlights for each of the periods indicated, in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. These financial statements and financial highlights (hereafter referred to as "financial statements") are the responsibility of the Funds' management; our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits. We conducted our audits of these financial statements in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America, which require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements, assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, and evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits, which included confirmation of securities at September 30, 2002 by correspondence with the custodian and brokers, provide a reasonable basis for our opinion. /s/PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP Milwaukee, Wisconsin November 22, 2002 INFORMATION ABOUT DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS The business and affairs of the Funds are managed under the direction of the Funds' Board of Directors. Information pertaining to the Directors and Officers of the Funds are set forth below. The SAI includes additional information about the Funds' Directors and Officers and is available, without charge, upon request by calling 1-800-711-1848. [Enlarge/Download Table] TERM OF # OF PORTFOLIOS OTHER POSITIONS(S) OFFICE AND IN FUND COMPLEX DIRECTORSHIPS HELD WITH LENGTH OF PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION OVERSEEN BY HELD BY DIRECTOR NAME, ADDRESS AND AGE THE FUND TIME SERVED DURING PAST FIVE YEARS DIRECTOR OR OFFICER OR OFFICER --------------------- ------------ ----------- ---------------------- ------------------- ---------------- David W. Tice*<F35> Director, Director - Indefinite, President of David W. Tice 2 None 8140 Walnut Hill Lane President since 1995; President - & Associates, Inc., the adviser Suite 300 and 1 yr term, since 1995; of the Funds since 1993; Dallas, TX 75231 Treasurer Treasurer - 1 yr term, President of BTN Research, Age: 47 since 1995 Inc. David Eric Luck Independent Indefinite, President of Redstone Oil & 2 None 9223 Club Glen Drive Director since 1995 Gas Company since 1988 Dallas, TX 75243 Age: 47 Kim Evans Independent Indefinite, Private investor 2 None 1829 Claridge Court Director since 2000 Maitland, FL 32789 Age: 56 Gregg Jahnke*<F35> Director, Director - Indefinite, Analyst and senior strategist 2 None 8140 Walnut Hill Lane Vice since 1995 (resigned for David W. Tice & Suite 300 President, May 29, 2002 and Associates, Inc. Dallas, TX 75231 Secretary reinstated September Age: 44 23, 2002); Vice President - 1 yr term, since 1995; Secretary - 1 yr term, since 1995 Edmund M. McCarthy Director Indefinite, Principal, President and CEO 2 None 6060 SW 85th Street since 2002 of Financial Risk Management Miami, FL 33143 Advisors Co. Age: 67 *<F35> Denotes a director who is an "interested person" as that term is defined in Section 2 (a)(19) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the "1940 Act"). INVESTMENT ADVISER DAVID W. TICE & ASSOCIATES, INC. 8140 WALNUT HILL LANE, SUITE 300 DALLAS, TEXAS 75231 HTTP://WWW.PRUDENTBEAR.COM ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSFER AGENT, DIVIDEND PAYING AGENT & SHAREHOLDER SERVICING AGENT U.S. BANCORP FUND SERVICES, LLC 615 EAST MICHIGAN STREET P.O. BOX 701 MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53201 1-800-711-1848 CUSTODIAN U.S. BANK, N.A. P.O. BOX 701 MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53201 INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN LEGAL COUNSEL FOLEY & LARDNER MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

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