Opportunity Partners LP · DFAN14A · Dresdner Rcm Global Strategic Income Fund Inc · On 10/30/00

Filed On 10/30/00 2:21pm ET   ·   SEC File 811-04800   ·   Accession Number 896017-0-500016

Additional Definitive Non-Management Proxy Solicitation Material   ·   Schedule 14A
Filing Table of Contents

Document/Exhibit                   Description                      Pages   Size 

 1: DFAN14A     Additional Definitive Non-Management Proxy             2±     7K 
                          Solicitation Material                                  

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PRESS RELEASE                                                                   

Shareholders of Dresdner RCM Global Strategic Income Fund Reject                
Recommendation by ISS and Vote to Open-end                                      

New York October 30, 2000 -- Opportunity Partners L.P. announced                
today that preliminary results indicate that stockholders of                    
Dresdner RCM Global Strategic Income Fund, Inc. (DSF) have voted                
overwhelmingly to approve its proposal to convert DSF from a                    
closed-end fund to an open-end fund.  Prior to submission of the                
Opportunity Partners proposal, DSF's shares had traded at a                     
discount in excess of 20% below their net asset value (NAV).  If                
the proposal is implemented, stockholders will be able to redeem                
their shares at any time at NAV.                                                

The open-ending proposal was opposed by both DSF's board of                     
directors and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the                     
nation's leading proxy advisory firm.  Nevertheless, it was                     
approved by shareholders by a margin of roughly 2 to 1.  In a                   
statement issued today, Phillip Goldstein, portfolio manager of                 
Opportunity Partners said: "This vote is further evidence that                  
ISS is out of touch with many shareholders of closed-end funds                  
and other companies whose stocks are trading below their                        
intrinsic value.  ISS often fails to appreciate the economic                    
benefit to shareholders of closing a persistent gap between a                   
stock's market price and its underlying value and is more                       
tolerant than shareholders of a lack of meaningful action by                    
management to close that gap."                                                  

Goldstein accused ISS of employing an "ivory tower" approach to                 
analyzing proxy contests that emphasizes corporate governance                   
theory rather than measures to increase shareholder value.  In                  
addition to DSF, he cited two other examples where he alleges ISS               
produced a flawed analysis that led to an embarrassingly wrong                  
recommendation.  Last March, ISS agreed with the management of                  
the Foreign and Colonial Emerging Middle East Fund that                         
shareholders should vote against a proposal to permit them to                   
realize NAV.  The proposal received more than 90% of the votes                  
cast by shareholders.  "When shareholders and ISS wind up 180                   
degrees apart, it obviously calls their analysis into question,"                
Goldstein commented.                                                            

In another instance cited by Goldstein, ISS supported management                
in a proxy contest launched in 1997 by a dissident shareholder of               
Baldwin Piano and Organ Company who had sought to have the                      
company sold.  Despite Baldwin's prolonged underperformance and a               
consensus view that its stock price of $13-to $14 was                           
significantly less than its breakup value, ISS recommended that                 
shareholders support the incumbent board of directors saying,                   
"[W]e believe management's efforts to turn the company around                   
have been considerable, and we believe Baldwin has significant                  
potential in the future . . . Baldwin has made significant                      
strides toward modernizing its manufacturing capabilities and                   
improving the overall operation of the company.  ISS concurred                  
with Baldwin management that disrupting its strategic plan by                   
replacing the board would not be in shareholders' best interests,               
adding, ". . . the strategic plan and the improved results are                  
moving Baldwin in the right direction."                                         

Baldwin's board was re-elected in accordance with ISS's                         
recommendation but the company's financial performance continued                
to deteriorate.  Baldwin's stock price is currently around $3.25                
per share but ISS denies any responsibility for the loss of                     
shareholder value.  Its standard disclaimer for its work product                
states that "we assume no liability with respect to the                         
consequences of relying on [our analysis or recommendation] for                 
investment or other purposes."  Goldstein called the ISS                        
disclaimer "an attempt to distance itself from any recommendation               
it makes that leads to losses for shareholders."  "How," he                     
asked, "can ISS in good conscience deny that its poor judgment                  
may have been a factor in the dramatic loss of value that Baldwin               
shareholders have suffered?"                                                    

Goldstein urged ISS and its competitors to focus on providing                   
proxy-voting advice that will enhance shareholder value.  "After                
all, of what value is a recommendation that does not even purport               
to answer the key question that most shareholders care about when               
voting a proxy: `How should I vote to increase the value of my                  
investment?'"                                                                   

Opportunity Partners L.P. is a New York based investment                        
partnership with assets of $46 million.                                         

Contact: Phillip Goldstein at (914) 747-5262 or oplp@att.net.                   

Dates Referenced Herein   and   Documents Incorporated By Reference

This DFAN14A Filing		Date		Other Filings
Filed On / Filed As Of		10/30/00
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